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In this thesis, I will analyse the European burqa ban phenomenon through the theoretical 
framework of terrorism as a provocation strategy. The aim is to analyse and provide insight on 
the effects of the restrictive legislation on radicalisation and terrorist activity. This thesis argues 
that by implementing restrictions on the use of the full-face veil, the European governments 
risk exacerbating existing grievances and offering terrorist organisations valuable message for 
recruitment, which could lead to increase in radicalisation and terrorist activity.  The hypothesis 
tested in the analysis then claims that implementation of a burqa ban leads to an increase in 
radicalisation and terrorist activity. 
 
The logic of provocation relies on the assumption that terrorist groups use terrorist tactics to 
overcome the collective action problem by goading the perceived enemy government into an 
indiscriminate counterterrorism response that would then lead to radicalisation of the 
moderates and mobilise more people to violence. The instrumental value of indiscriminate 
counterterrorism response, meaning that the measures would target the whole population the 
terrorists are part of, as a radicalising factor is the main theoretical focus area of this research 
and will be employed as the theoretical argument applied to the analysis of the effects of the 
legislation restricting the use of the full-face veils. Burqa bans, then, are understood here as 
indiscriminate government response targeting the whole European Muslim population.  
 
Previous research shows that indiscriminate or particularly harsh counterterrorism measures as 
a response to terrorist incident cause a backlash effect which leads to increase in terrorist 
activity. Researchers and security experts have also indicated that the burqa ban could lead to 
a similar counterproductive effect in alienating an already marginalized group of people even 
further and might serve as a radicalising factor in the long run. This thesis will build on these 
findings. 
 
The analysis, conducted as a case study on France, provided some initial support for the 
argument. Based on the analysis of the French burqa ban, its effects on Muslim women, 
terrorist propaganda material and terrorism and foreign fighter statistics, it can be concluded 
that the analysis supports the argument about the ban providing tools for terrorist recruitment. 
In addition, accounts provided by the Muslim women provide initial support for the grievances 
based argument. Analysis of the terrorism and foreign fighter provide some initial support for 
the argument, however, the data is insufficient for drawing robust and comprehensive 
conclusions. The methodology and data employed are unable to provide robust support for the 
hypothesis claiming that implementing a burqa ban leads to increase in radicalisation and 
terrorist activity. For comprehensive and sufficient analysis on the effects of the burqa ban on 
radicalisation and terrorist activity further research is needed.
Tampereen yliopisto 
Johtamiskorkeakoulu 
Politiikan tutkimuksen tutkinto-ohjelma  
 
SANNA VEIKKOLA: “Whose interests does the burqa ban serve? An analysis of the effects of 
the ban on full-face veils on radicalisation and terrorism in France" 
 
Pro gradu –tutkielma, 67 sivua 
Kansainvälisen politiikan opintosuunta 
Marraskuu 2017 
 
 
Tämän tutkimus tarkastelee burkakieltojen vaikutusta radikalisoitumiskehitykselle ja 
terroristiselle toiminnalle Euroopassa. Tarkastelen burkakieltoja terrorismintutkimuksessa 
hyödynnetyn provokaatiostrategian avulla. Argumentoin, että burkan käyttöä säätelevät 
rajoitukset vahvistavat Euroopan muslimiyhteisöihin kohdistuvia epäkohtia ja heidän kokemaa 
epäoikeudenmukaisuuden tunnetta, mikä tarjoaa terrorijärjestöille työkaluja propagandan 
levittämiseen ja lisää radikalisoitumisen ja terroristisen toiminnan todennäköisyyttä. Tutkimuksen 
päähypoteesina on oletus, että burkakiellot johtavat radikalisoitumisen ja terroristisen toiminnan 
lisääntymiseen.  
 
Provokaatiostrategian mukaan terrorijärjestöt pyrkivät terrori-iskujen kautta yllyttämään valtioita 
kohtuuttoman järeisiin vastatoimiin, jotka kohdistuisivat koko terroristen edustamaan 
väestönosaan. Kohtuuttomasti sivullista siviiliväestöä koettelevat vastatoimet puolestaan 
johtaisivat väestön maltillisen aineksen radikalisoitumiseen sekä väkivaltaiseen 
mobilisoitumiseen. Tutkimuksen pääpaino on erityisesti valtioiden terrorisminvastaisten toimien 
radikalisoivassa vaikutuksessa. Burkakielto ymmärretään tämän tutkimuksen puitteissa erityisesti 
Euroopan muslimiväestöön kohdistuvana kohtuuttomana terrorisminvastaisena toimena.  
 
Aiempi akateeminen tutkimus osoittaa, että kokonaista väestönosaa kohtuuttoman kovasti 
koettelevat terrorisminvastaiset toimet johtavat terroristisen toiminnan lisääntymiseen. Kyseessä 
on siis eräänlainen vastailmiö; terrorismintorjunnan nimissä toimeenpannut käytännöt lisäävät 
terrorismia terroristisen toiminnan kitkemisen sijaan. Burkakieltoihin syventyneet tutkijat ja 
asiantuntijat ovat varoittaneet samalaisen vastailmiön mahdollisuudesta burkan käyttöä 
rajoittavan lainsäädännön toimesta. Pro gradu –tutkimukseni rakentuu näille löydöksille.  
 
Tutkimus rakentuu kiellon vaikutusten tarkastelulle Ranskassa. Aineiston analyysi muodostuu 
neljästä eri elementistä: kiellon vaikutuksista musliminaisten elämään, terrorismipropagandan 
tarkastelusta sekä kiellon vaikutusten tarkastelusta suhteessa terrori-iskujen ja maasta lähteneiden 
vierastaistelijoiden määrään. Analyysin tulokset tukevat argumenttia, jonka mukaan kiellot 
tarjoavat terroristijärjestöille värväys- ja propagandatyökaluja. Kiellon vaikutusten tarkastelu 
suhteessa musliminaisten elämään puolestaan tuottaa varovaista tukea argumentille kiellon 
epäoikeudenmukaisuuden tunnetta lisäävästä vaikutuksesta. Terrorismi- ja 
vierastaistelijatilastojen tarkastelu puolestaan tuottaa varovaista tukea pääargumentille, mutta 
luotettavien johtopäätöstä vetäminen tutkimuksessa hyödynnetyn aineiston pohjalta ei toteudu. 
Metodologia ja aineisto eivät siten tuottamaan tutkimuksen hypoteesia tukevia tuloksia. Analyysi 
ja tulokset antavat viitteitä hypoteesia tukevasta kehityksestä, mutta luotettavien tulosten ja 
johtopäätösten tuottaminen aiheen tiimoilta jää tulevien tutkimusprojektien tehtäväksi.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Since 2014, Europe has experienced a sharp increase in both terrorist attacks and immigration. 
This link has not been missed in European and larger Western public and political discourse, and 
has even been perpetuated by recent terrorist attacks carried out by people who have entered 
Europe as asylum seekers or through the “refugee route” posing as asylum seekers. Terrorism has 
increasingly become an immigration question, and as a result, Muslims in Europe and in the West, 
have become under increasing scrutiny.  In Europe, at the same time, attitudes towards 
immigration at large and Muslims in particular have hardened, and calls for tougher immigration 
policies and actions to preserve the Western way of life have increased. The public space is 
becoming more and more tolerant for discriminative policies, nationalist messages and even racist 
slurs and hate speech. 
 
European governments, unprepared for the mass wave of immigrants that arrived in 2015 and 
2016 are now rushing to piece together counterterrorism and counter extremism plans as well as 
plans for better integrating immigrants into European society and European way of life. Germany 
is an example of a country where the government has become under increasing pressure from the 
rise of right-wing parties, which has led to the government proposing and adopting tougher 
immigration and anti-radicalisation measures in order to contain the far-right and appease the 
public. 
 
In Germany, one of the most visible and most publicised measures has been the call for and the 
subsequent implementation of a partial ban on full-face veils or burqas as they are referred to in 
the media and public discourse. Austria was another country to implement a ban on face coverings 
in 2017 and it was discussed in Denmark and Norway. The burqa was very visibly present in the 
2017 election campaign of the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and earlier in 2017 
an Australian right-wing politician made international headlines by wearing a full burqa in the 
parliament chambers.  
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Legal documents spelling out the restrictions or bans on the use of full-face veil usually use overly 
neutral language and refrain from explicitly referring to the burqa. Instead, the ban is usually 
phrased as applying to all face coverings. However, regardless of the country, the debate, be it 
political or public, surrounding the issue and the arguments made in favour of the ban make it 
clear that the legislation is aimed at restricting the use of the burqa. This is also a widely-shared 
understanding among the academic community. Better integration of immigrants to European 
society and women’s rights are often provided as the key arguments is support of a ban. There is 
always, however an underline that imply that burqas and niqabs are incompatible with the Western 
way of life, that they are representation of gender inequality, and have no place in Europe. There 
are also examples of direct linkages drawn between the veil and security, especially terrorism. 
The most obvious example being the short-lived burkini ban in France in summer 2016, where 
the local officials referred to the beachwear as being sympathetic to extremism. In March 2017, 
the European People’s Party published a proposal for a cohesive society and countering Islamic 
extremism in which they called for a European Union wide ban on full-face veils. These examples 
indicate that the burqa and niqab are seen as security threats and as factors that prohibit integration 
and fuel radicalisation.  
 
Experts, academics and security professionals have cautioned that implementing a burqa ban 
might be counterproductive in its efforts to speed integration and enhance security and women’s 
rights, and might in the long run serve as a radicalising factor. Despite these warnings and the lack 
of evidence on the benefits of such a ban, governments across the globe have continued to adopt 
it as part of their counter-terrorism measures, national security policies or initiatives relating to 
better integration and social cohesion like in many European countries.  
 
This study asks whether there are linkages between the burqa bans and increase in radicalisation 
and terrorism, and argues that by implementing restrictions on the use of the full-face veil, the 
European governments risk exacerbating grievances and offering terrorist organisations a valuable 
recruiting tool, which could lead to increase in radicalisation and terrorist activity. The analysis 
will focus on the effects the ban has had on the societal and individual level, while analysing the 
possible implications it has had on terrorist activity and radicalisation in France.  
 
Previous research shows that state repression on religious grounds as well as minority 
discrimination are strong predictors of terrorist attacks in countries (Piazza 2017; Choi and Piazza 
2016). Existing literature on terrorism has also established that the way regimes treat and respect 
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their citizens’ rights and minority rights have an effect on the patterns of terrorism in countries 
(Piazza 2017). When it comes to responding to terrorism, indiscriminate counterterrorism 
measures that target whole population or a group of people instead of only targeting terrorists 
themselves have been found to increase terrorist activity (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; 
Gill, Piazza and Horgan 2016). 
 
This study will build on these findings by applying the argument of indiscriminate 
counterterrorism measures functioning as inducement for radicalisation and terrorism to the 
European context and arguing that a burqa ban constitutes this kind of indiscriminate measure that 
aims containing Islam at large. Further justifications will be provided later in the research. In 
addition, this research will contribute to the existing body of terrorism and conflict literature by 
employing collective action paradigm as the theoretical framework and supporting it with the 
literature focusing on terrorism as a provocation strategy. According to this theoretical logic, 
terrorists face an acute collective action problem, which they need to overcome, because they need 
members and support from population they are members of or perceived to represent to survive. 
Based on the provocation strategy, to overcome the collective action problem, the extremist 
organisations launch terrorist attacks against the enemy, usually a government, in the hopes of 
provoking the government to an indiscriminate counterterrorism response targeting the entire 
population or community the terrorists are part of. This would then exacerbate grievances and 
discontent in the community. By retaliating in a harsh and disproportionate way the government 
legitimizes the terrorists’ agenda, radicalise more people and sometimes entirely eliminate the 
collective action problem. This study will then support the argument that terrorism provides the 
extremist organisations a powerful tool to recruit new members and to overcome the collective 
action problem.  
 
The methodology employed in this research is a single-country case study focusing on France. 
France was chosen because it has had a burqa ban in place since 2011 and for this reason data 
availability is not a problem. In addition to the burqa ban, France has had a ban on religious 
symbols in schools since 2004. Together, these provide scope and depth for analysis. Limitations 
caused by the chosen method as well as the difficulties faced in formulating the argument and 
research design will be explained in the research design section.  
 
There are multiple limitations to this study. Firstly, no single explanation for terrorism or 
radicalisation exists. Even though this study attempts to establish a theoretical and empirical link 
	 5	
between the burqa ban and terrorism and radicalisation, this is not an attempt to draw direct causal 
links between these phenomena. Nor is my intention to argue that the burqa ban alone explains 
terrorism or radicalisation. There are multiple causes for terrorism and radicalisation and the angle 
introduced in this thesis research is one way to approach the complexity of the problem. This 
study attempts to explore whether a burqa ban could be a factor in the radicalisation process and 
in determining which countries experience terrorism. Burqa ban, however, is only one factor, and 
can’t explain the whole phenomenon.  
 
The goal of this thesis is to make an initial attempt at analysing the relationship between burqa 
bans and radicalisation and terrorism, not to unveil to complexity of the issue at once. Extensive 
further research is needed to analyse the full-spectrum of implications the bans have both on 
country, society and individual level. This will be further emphasized later in this research. This 
study examines the issue from one angle by applying an existing theoretical framework to the 
question, and the conclusions drawn here represent one interpretation of the issue and the material 
used for analysis. Also, it should be noted, that the theoretical approach employed in this research, 
namely the provocation strategy, represents one approach to terrorism. Other strategies exist, but 
the one adopted here is chosen, because the aim of this research is to test the argumentative power 
of the provocation strategy in relation to the burqa ban.  
 
This thesis paper will proceed as follows: the following section will provide definitions for key 
concepts used throughout the study, after which an introduction to burqa bans, the current debate 
surrounding the issue and recent legislative examples will be provided. The third section will 
provide historical and political context for the burqa ban debate and existing research on the topic 
will be explored in the fourth part. The fifth section lays out the theoretical framework and causal 
chain through which the argument and hypothesis will be formulated. The final two sections 
before concluding remarks include the research design and the actual analysis of the case study 
material.  
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2. Terminology 
 
Before proceeding further with the research, key concepts will be defined, and their 
operationalisation for the purposes of this study will be offered to avoid confusion and false 
conclusions. Terrorism as discussed and analysed in this study should be understood as a strategy 
employed by a group or an organisation to reach political change (Tilly 2004: 5-6; Hoffman 1998: 
43). The most corresponding definition of terrorism would be that of Enders et al (2011: 321) 
which defines terrorism as “the premediated use or threat to use violence by individuals or 
subnational groups against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through 
the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims.” 
 
However, apart from the theoretical section which offers a general theoretical framework not 
particular to any specific type of terrorism, this research will focus solely on Islamist or jihadist 
(TE-SAT 2017) or Salafi Jihadist (Sageman 2004) terrorism. This means that the focus will be in 
acts or incidents stemming from or motivated by jihadist or radical Islamist ideology. Europe faces 
and has faced terrorism on many other fronts as well, however, due to this research focusing on 
the effect burqa bans have on radicalisation and terrorist activity, the choice to focus on Islamist 
terrorism is justified.  
 
Since the terrorism data used in the analysis section is obtained from Europol’s European Union 
Terrorism Situation and Trends Reports from years 2007 and 2017 (covering all the years from 
2006 to 2016), the definition of terrorism employed in the analysis is the one used by Europol. 
Europol’s reports in general categorise terrorist organisations by their source of motivation. For 
the reasons mentioned above, terrorism in the context of this research will mean Islamist terrorism. 
The term is adopted from the Europol reports, which until 2011 used the term. After that they 
switched to religiously-inspired terrorism and after that jihadist terrorism, which is used in the 
latest report. However, this report will employ the term Islamist terrorism because I deem it to be 
more representative of the whole range of actors and organisations out there.  
 
	 7	
According to the Europol definition, “Jihadist terrorist acts are those that are committed out of a 
mindset that rejects democracy on religious grounds and uses the historical comparison with 
Crusades of the Middle Ages to describe current situations, in which it is believed that Sunni Islam 
is facing a “Crusader alliance” composed of Shi’is, Christians and Jews.” (TE-SAT 2017: 55) 
 
The above definition will be employed in the analysis section. However, the Europol definition is 
very specific, and does not cover the what, why and how of terrorism usually included in the 
definitions. This is why the study is based on the broader definition of terrorism presented above 
and the Europol categorisation will only be used in the analysis.  
 
 This research uses the term burqa as being synonymous to the full-face veil. This is not accurate 
use of terms since most Muslim women in Europe wearing the full-veil actually use niqab and not 
burqa. Niqab is the full-face veil that leaves the eyes uncovered. Burqa on the other hand covers 
the whole body from the head to toe and has a mesh in front of the eyes. Hijab when mentioned 
in the text on the other hand refers to the headscarf that covers the hair and neck, but leaves the 
whole face uncovered. The use of the word burqa in reference to the full-face veil is a conscious 
choice and justified in this context by the common use of the term burqa ban in media, academic 
literature and political and public discourse. By using the same term, this study then binds itself 
to the current political debate and the existing academic research. Burqa ban on the other hand, 
refers to restrictive legislation that in general prohibits the use of all face coverings in public. 
France is used as the case study here, however, burqa ban does not refer to the French legislation 
alone but is a general term employed to refer to all the laws that restrict the use of the full-face 
veil.  
 
In this research, radicalisation is understood as “a growing readiness to pursue and support far-
reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order.” 
(Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 798). The definition for radical comes from the same Dalgaard-Nielsen 
(2010: 798) article, and it is understood as “a person harbouring a deep-felt desire for fundamental 
socio-political changes”.  
 
Foreign fighters on the other hand are understood here as individuals who have left their countries 
of residence to join the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Most of the foreign fighters joined Islamic State 
even though a small minority is believed to have fought for other rebel factions and even the 
government side (The Soufan Group 2015: 5). Since this research focuses solely on the foreign 
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fighters travelling to Iraq and Syria, the above definition is used. However, a number of 
researchers have offered definitions to describe the wider phenomenon that is far older than 
Islamic State and the Syrian conflict. David Malet (2015: 6) for example proposes foreign fighter 
to be defined as “a non citizen of a state experiencing civil conflict who arrives from an external 
state to join an insurgency”.  
 
French model of cultural assimilation is mentioned multiple times in relation to the burqa ban, 
and while it will be explained in greater detail in the analysis section, I will offer a brief description 
of the term here. Cultural assimilation approach is a cultural integration theory that aims at 
“gradual disappearance of original cultural and behavioural patterns in favour of new ones” 
(Algan et al. 2012: 4).  In the end, as a result of complete assimilation, “diverse immigrant groups 
are expected to ‘melt’ into the mainstream culture through an inter-generational process of cultural, 
social, and economic integration” (Algan et al. 2012: 4).  
 
Islamophobia is another term frequently used in the text, especially in the literature review, and 
requires clear definition. According to Oxford English Dictionary definition, Islamophobia mean 
“dislike of or prejudice against Islam or Muslims, especially as a political force” (Oxford 
Dictionaries). Douglas Pratt, whose research will be referred to in the literature review, defines 
Islamophobia as “a manifestation of fear of an exclusionary Islam” which is manifested as 
“exclusionary or negatively reactive behaviours with Muslims and Islam as the target” (Pratt 2015: 
205).  
 
This research is heavily relying on the concept of indiscriminate counterterrorism measures 
carried out by government forces. When the measures are indiscriminate, it means that they target 
a whole group of people or population without making distinction between people supporting 
terrorist cause or the perpetrators themselves and the rest of the population. Indiscriminate 
measures usually affect innocent bystanders and cause collateral damage, as further explained 
later in this research. Discriminate response to terrorist attack, on the other hand, entails targeting 
only the perpetrators in the counter effort and avoiding causing any kind of damage to the general 
public or innocent civilians (Kydd and Walter 2006: 70). According to Lake (2002: 19) an 
indiscriminate response to terrorism “punishes the broad population of which the terrorists are 
part.” 
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3. Burqa Bans  
	
3.1. Current Debate 
 
Burqa seems to be an increasingly hot topic in political and public discourse in contemporary 
European society. Rarely has a piece of women’s clothing raised as much controversy and as 
many opinions as the burqa does today. One only needs to look at the recent political events to 
see the political, religious and cultural symbolic the garment carries.  
 
In Germany, for example, the burqa was well represented in the run-up to the September 2017 
federal election. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party ran a highly visible anti-
immigration election campaign with adds picturing bikini-clad women and a text indicating that 
in Germany women wear bikinis and not burqas (Petzinger 1.9.2017, Quartz). In September 2017, 
right before the German election, a niqab-clad woman, representing the Chancellor Merkel and 
her immigration policies, was leading a far-right Pegida march in Dresden (Kauhanen 17.9.2017, 
HS). This highlights the political symbolic the burqa bears as a representation of the Islamic 
“Other” that threatens Europe.  
 
In August 2017, Australian right-wing politician Pauline Hanson made international headlines 
when she entered the Senate chamber dressed in a burqa in an attempt to draw attention her call 
to ban the burqa due to national security concerns (Murphy 17.8.2017, The Guardian). Earlier in 
August 2017, a prank picture of empty bus seats posted on a Norwegian nationalist anti-
immigration Facebook group caused the group to be publicly mocked after the group mistook the 
empty seats for six burqa-clad women. The picture sparked a furious debate amongst the group 
members, various people describing the sight scary and calling for the garment to be banned 
(Pasha-Robinson 1.8.2017, Independent).  
 
One of the most controversial burqa debacles rook place in the summer of 2016 when several 
French cities Muslim women from wearing the full-body swimsuit, burkini, on their beaches.  
Burkini is a full-body swimsuit that leaves the face uncovered. Shocking pictures and videos of 
	 10	
male police officers standing around a Muslim woman on a beach in Nice and ordering her to 
remove the garment (Winer 24.8.2016, Times of Israel). According to the Mayor of Cannes, the 
burkinis were banned because they are both “not respectful of good morals and secularism” and a 
dangerous “symbol on Islamic extremism.” Another official told Time that the burkini makes 
“reference to an allegiance to terrorist movements who are at war with us.” (Huckerby  24.8.2016, 
Time).  
 
Burkinis were seen to be too provocative in the aftermath of yet another terrorist incident on 
French soil during Bastille Day celebrations in July 2016 (BBC 1.9.2016). These comments drew 
a straight line between some Muslim women wearing a full-body swimsuit to a beach and 
terrorism. France’s top administrative court ordered the beach towns to lift the ban in its ruling in 
August 2016 (BBC 1.9.2016).  
 
 
3.2. Burqa Bans Across Europe 
 
On October 1st, 2017 Austria became the latest European country to ban full-face veils and other 
face coverings and masks that cover the whole face. On the same day that the legislation 
prohibiting face coverings in public places entered into force, news articles across Europe featured 
a picture of a Muslim women being asked to remove her veil by Austrian police officers. Defying 
the new ban will result in a fine of 150 Euros (Nianias 1.10.2017, The Telegraph). Proponents of 
the new legislation cited security reasons and claimed face covering veils are anti-social and 
hinder integration of immigrants into the Austrian society (King 31.1.2017, Politico).  
 
In late September 2017, the upper house of German parliament, Bundestag, passed a new traffic 
legislation prohibiting full-face coverings while driving (Chase 22.9.2017, Deutsche Welle). This 
follows another legislation from April 2017 banning civil servants, judges and soldiers from 
wearing Islamic full-face veil while at work (Walsh 28.4.2017, Deutsche Welle). Following the 
approval of the Austrian burqa ban, the general secretary of Angela Merkel’s Bavarian sister party 
CSU called for a similar ban in Germany, stating that “the Burqa does not belong in Germany” 
(Belson 2.10.2017, Politico).  
 
	 11	
In early October 2017 Denmark looks set to become the next European country to adopt a ban on 
burqas and niqabs as most parties in the Danish parliament have decided to support a proposal for 
a ban (Reuters 6.10.2017). Denmark’s Nordic neighbour Norway in June 2017 proposed a ban on 
full-face Muslim veils in kindergartens, schools and universities (Reuters 12.6.2017). In 
Switzerland, a group advocating for a burqa ban have collected more than 100 000 signatures in 
support of the ban and they will propose the federal government to set up a referendum on the 
issue. According to the campaign leader, full-face veils are “a symbol of radical Islam” and 
representation of oppression against women (Reuters 15.9.2017). This follows and unsuccessful 
attempt to advance the ban in the Swiss parliament, where the upper house voted down a proposal 
for a burqa ban in March 2017. One Swiss canton, Italian-speaking Ticino has had a burqa ban in 
place since it was passed in a referendum in 2016 (Wicki 9.3.2017, Politico).  
 
France and Belgium were the first European states to pass a law on full-face veils 2011. In 
Belgium, there had been bans on concealing the face on the local administration level even before 
2011, but after the proposal was passed into federal level law violations of the law would be met 
with a fine of 15 to 25 euros or imprisonment of one to seven days. Exceptions to the ban included 
situations where concealing one’s face was justified for health or safety reasons or on the occasion 
of public festivities (Amnesty International 2012: 93).  
 
In France, the legislation prohibiting any form of dress aimed at concealing the face in public 
entered into force in April 2011. The law basically allows wearing of full-face veils only at home, 
in private cars or in places of worship. Exceptions to the law included existing safety and health 
regulations and public festivities, similarly to Belgium (Amnesty International 2012, 95). In 
addition to the 2011 ban on burqas, France already had in place a 2004 legislation prohibiting 
students from wearing religious symbols in school. This legislation has been widely interpreted 
as directly targeting the Muslim headscarf (Chrisafis 13.4.2016, The Guardian).  
 
The French and Belgian burqa bans have both been challenged in the European Court of Human 
Rights on the grounds that the bans were in violation of the European Convention of Human 
Rights and especially its articles 8, 9 and 14 guaranteeing right to respect for private and family 
life, freedom thought, conscience and religion and prohibition of discrimination. In both cases, 
first in a complaint issued against France in 2014 and then against Belgium in 2017, the court 
found that the legislation was not in violation of those above-mentioned articles (ECHR 2014, 
S.A.S. vs. France no. 43835/11; ECHR 241(2017)). A press release form July 2017 concerning 
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the Belgian case states, that the Court found that the restriction “sought to guarantee the conditions 
of “living together” and the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” and that it was 
“necessary in a democratic society”” (ECHR 241(2017) which in the court’s eyes made the ban 
justifiable.  
 
In late 2016, the Netherlands joined the group of European states banning burqa and niqab in 
public transport, educational institutions, health institutions and government buildings (The 
Guardian 29.11.2016). The government had already proposed a ban on face coverings as early as 
in 2012 and during that time argued that the “prohibition would guarantee the social order in the 
Netherlands and that concealing the face constituted an obstacle to open communication and social 
participation.” Regardless of an existing legislation requiring a person to remove face coverings 
for identity checks, the Dutch government argued that “concealing the face may pose a threat to 
security.” (Amnesty International 2012, 98).  
 
The Bulgarian parliament, on the other hand, approved legislation banning burqas and niqabs in 
public in September 2016. Supporters of the ban said it would “boost security after Islamist 
militant attacks in Europe” while opponents of the ban, like the ethnic Turkish Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms, said the ban would incite ethnic and religious intolerance (Krasimirov 
30.9.2017, Reuters). In the UK, the burqa ban has been on and off the political debate for quite a 
while, but after a surge of terrorist attacks in the country in 2017 the debate resurfaced once again 
and banning the burqa had been presented as one solution to curbing extremism in Britain after it 
was struck by terrorists three times in less than four months’ time in 2017 (McKay 4.6.2017, 
FoxNews). In April 2017, Ukip leader Paul Nuttall called for a burqa ban in the UK due to threats, 
security risks and concern over integration. Nuttall also made references to terrorism by saying 
that veils that cover the whole face rendered CCTV ineffective (Williams 27.4.2017, Channel4).  
 
In their report from 2012 Amnesty International noted that debates over possible burqa bans in 
several European countries including Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the UK have contributed to “strengthening 
stereotypes and prejudices against Muslims.” (Amnesty International 2012, 91). In 2017, this 
debate spread to the European Union level when In March 2017, European People’s Party, a 
centre-right coalition of European political parties in the European Parliament called for a Europe-
wide ban on full-face veils in public places, “both for reasons of security and because seeing one 
another’s faces is an integral part of human interaction in Europe”. This call was one point on 
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their list of actions to combat “Islamic extremism” in Europe and to build more cohesive European 
society in the face of Muslim immigration (EPP 3/2017: 2).  It is clear from the wording of the 
resolution that burqa is seen as a security question and that banning burqas would enhance security 
in Europe.  
  
 
3.3. Global Phenomenon 
 
Despite being frequently made to be about the difference between Islam and the West, burqa is 
not striking controversies only in the Western world. Local or nationwide bans have been 
implemented in multiple countries from Africa to Asia. According to a Pew Research Centre 
report from 2016, more countries globally have restrictions on women’s religious dress or symbols 
than require women to dress in a certain way (Pew Research Centre 5.4.2016). Europe is in the 
lead with 40 percent of the countries having had at least one restriction in place in 2012-2013 
(Pew Research Centre 5.4.2016). This does not apply to the burqa alone, but all women’s religious 
attires.  
 
Whilst in Europe the bans have been articulated in a manner that makes them about women’s 
rights, secularism, integration, identity checks and European cultural traditions, on a global scale 
it’s more often about security. The Chadian government instituted a burqa ban in 2015 after an 
alleged Boko Haram suicide bomber disguised in a burqa detonated his suicide vest in a crowded 
market, killing more than 15 people (Blair 2.5.2016, The Telegraph). Only a month after the 
Chadian ban came into effect, Cameroon banned the garment in its northernmost region bordering 
Boko Haram infected areas in Nigeria after it was struck by suicide bombings carried out by 
people clad in burqas. Niger’s government instituted a ban in its southern region of Diffa for 
similar reasons. Even Nigeria has considered implementing a ban on burqas after Boko Haram 
started using burqa-clad girls as suicide bombers (The Economist 11.2.1016; The Guardian 
16.8.2017).  
 
Congo-Brazzaville is another West-African country that moved to ban the burqa in 2015 to 
“prevent any act of terrorism” and Senegal is considering a ban for similar reasons. In December 
2015, all 15 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formally 
endorsed a ban on “clothing that prevents the clear identification of persons” (Blair 2.5.2016, The 
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Telegraph). In early 2017 Morocco banned the sale and production of burqas due to security 
concerns. Niqabs are still allowed however (Rothwell and Pigaglio 12.1.2017, The Telegraph).   
 
In March 2017, as part of their new “anti-extremism” regulations, China moved to prohibit full-
face veils in their western Xinjiang province that is home to the predominantly Muslim Uighur 
minority. Other anti-extremism measures included prohibition on long beards on men and too 
religious names on babies (Al Jazeera 1.4.2017). Tajikistan is another example of a country where 
preventive counter-terrorism policies require women to remove their headscarves and men to 
shave off their beards (Lain 2016: 392). Turkey on the other hand is moving to the opposite 
direction by officially lifting the ban on headscarves in all state institutions in 2017 after decades 
of them being prohibited (The Guardian 22.2.2017).  
 
 
3.4. Justification  
 
The list of examples provided above is not exhaustive since partial or local bans on hijabs, niqabs 
and burqas exist in a number on countries globally. However, the point made here through the 
examples proves that the burqa is being used to combat terrorism and extremism and can be as 
such researched in a wider counterterrorism framework. Even in Europe there are examples of 
clear references being made between the garment and terrorism, most notably in the French short 
lived ban on burkinis. Beydoun (2016: 1299) has argued that even though the French 2004 and 
2011 bans on headscarves and full-face veils are not counterterrorism measures per se, “the State 
enacted the bans as immediate policy response to terrorist acts committed by Muslim and the 
escalating fear of home-grown, masculine Muslim radicalization.” 
 
Despite constant claims by the European politicians and government officials that the bans are 
against all face coverings and not directed against Muslim women, it’s a common consensus 
amongst the academics, researchers and human rights advocates that it is clear from the texts and 
especially from the debate surrounding the issue, that the bans are specifically meant to target the 
Muslim headscarves and veils (e.g. Howard 2012: 148; Bleich 2009: 373; Davis 2011: 117-118; 
Nanwani 2011: 2; Cesari 2012: 444; Idriss 2016: 126-127; Amnesty International 2012: 93). One 
of the most used arguments promoting the ban state that a legal ban on face coverings is necessary 
in order to promote gender equality and fight the oppression of women who are forced to cover 
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their heads and faces by men. This makes it clear that the intended target is the garments worn by 
some Muslim women.  
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4. Islam Threat Scenario 
 
The various bans on religious symbols, headscarves and Islamic dresses are relatively new to the 
European public debate, at least when it comes to the volume, frequency and ferocity of the voices 
calling for restrictions on Muslims ability to practice their faith or manifest their religious identity. 
These bans and debates do not appear in a vacuum, but are heavily influenced by the growing fear 
of Islamic fundamentalism and the increasingly common interpretation of Islam as a threat. The 
restrictive legislation we now witness being implemented throughout Europe is a result of or a 
continuation of a long historical narrative constructing Islam as a threat to the West. 
 
In European public debate, terrorism is increasingly linked to Islam. In the post-9/11 space us 
Westerners have learned that “terrorism” is something foreign that threatens our western societies 
and way of life from the outside. There is a growing general perception of Islam as a threat to the 
Western liberal-secular order (Mavelli 2013: 159—160, 165). For example, Bleich (2009: 362—
363) writes that the general association between Muslims and violence in Europe today coupled 
with concerns about cultural adjustments have functioned as catalysts for significant policy 
changes in many European countries. Europe and especially France have witnessed a shift towards 
stricter immigration policies that often demand increasing attention paid to integration and 
assimilation of immigrants and minorities (Freedman 2007: 29; Cesari 2012: 430). Burqa bans 
constitute one piece of this puzzle, but the issue is often accompanied by a wider discussion 
concerning Islam’s role in European societies. Debates about building minarets or mosques as 
well as the correct way and venue for teaching religion are other examples (Bleich 2009: 364).  
 
Muslims are increasingly seen as something that needs to be contained and their behaviour better 
governed (Amiraux 2016: 37). Especially in France, Islam has become a source of fear, which is 
frequently fuelled by the perception that Islam threatens modernity and the survival of the Western 
values of freedom, equality and secularism (Doyle 2011: 485; Mavelli 2013: 172). Islam, and the 
burqa as a visible representation of Islam, are sometimes even viewed as the “antithesis of 
European values” (Edmunds 2012:73-75; Wiles 2007: 699).  
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In contemporary European and North American societies, previously marginal extreme views 
about Muslims and immigrant are becoming mainstream. Right-wing nationalist voices are 
becoming louder and ideas promoting harsh immigration policies and counter-terrorism measures, 
such as Donald Trump’s Muslim ban (e.g. BBC 10.2.2017), are increasingly tolerated. This is 
manifested not only by the normalisation of hate speech in the Western public space but the rise 
of right-wing parties and the success of political candidates who know how to exploit fear, divide 
and anger existing in society (Pratt 2015: 216). In some cases, mainstream political parties have 
had adopt more right-wing policies or make harder immigration initiatives in order to contain the 
rising far-right movements and court right-wing voters. In France, this courtship took the form of 
President Sarkozy starting the highly immigration centred debate about what it meant to be French 
in 2009 (Laurence and Goodliffe 2013: 35—37).  
 
More recently in late 2016, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel backtracked in her earlier open 
doors immigration policy, and demanded that ban on Islamic full-face veils should be adopted 
wherever possible. This has been largely interpreted as an obvious nod towards the right-wing 
voters in the run up to the 2017 general election (Karnitschnig, 6.12.2016, Politico; BBC 
6.12.2016). Edmunds (2012: 68, 74) writes that due to the increasingly prominent threat picture 
linked to Muslims and all things visibly Muslim the “social cost of being a European Muslim” has 
increased. Secular European governments often regard them as Muslims first and citizens second 
while drawing a line between good Muslims who choose to assimilate and discard their visibly 
religious and Muslim identity and bad or distrustful Muslims who wear headscarves and grow 
beards and visibly choose to manifest their Muslim identity.  
 
Even though the events of 9/11 played a major role in painting the picture of Islam as a security 
threat, the perceive linkages between Muslims and violence in Europe go further back in history. 
The meaningful association between Islam and terror in the aftermath of 9/11 was only possible 
because there was an already existing narrative through which the message could be interpreted 
(Mavelli 2013: 165). This narrative, according to Bleich (2009: 264—265) is the increasing 
association between Muslims and violence since the 1980s. Honicker (2014: 271) on the other 
hand argues that especially in France, the issue with the burqa dates back to their colonial 
experiences in North Africa, especially in Algeria. Bleich (2009: 264—265) argues that since the 
1980s, the association between violence and Muslims has emerged in three different areas: 
violence against women, immigrant criminality and religiously motivated violence. Together 
these three topics have paved the way for the idea about violent Islam.  
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According to Mavelli (2013: 161, 165) the threat association is a result of the historical and 
political formation of Western and European modernity, in which Islam was pitted against the 
West due it being seen as a totalitarian system of religion and politics. This is of course in direct 
conflict with the Western secularism that separates politics and religion. Especially in France, 
religious symbols such as hijabs, niqabs and burqas represent refusal to confine religion to the 
private space, which consequently makes them a threat to national security. Muslims who choose 
to grow a beard or wear a veil are interpreted to threaten national security because they refuse to 
conform with the “secular and civilizing French culture” (Edmunds 2012: 73). In Australia, the 
most pessimistic views see Muslims as a threat to the Australian “democracy, its system of 
government, separation of church and state, laws, basic rights and the freedoms of worship, dress 
and movement; and the ‘general level of peace and harmony’”(Yasmeen 2013: 254). This 
combined with the “war on terror” framework has made it possible to indiscriminately target all 
Muslims in hunt for terrorist suspects and at the same time grant “justification for the suspension 
of rights on the grounds of national security, enabling increased use of surveillance and erosion 
of citizenship rights” (Edmunds 2012: 76).  
 
European nations today face a paradox: guaranteeing national security and sufficient response to 
growing terrorism concerns seem to require a trade-off between civil and minority rights and 
sufficient resources directed to integration efforts on the one hand and robust counterterrorism 
measures on the other (Garcia and Geva 2016: 30—32; Cesari 2012: 437; Shor et al. 2017: 1—2). 
Restricting Islam from the public space is a visible and desirable response in that if offers a 
relatively easy short-term response to increasing security concerns. At the same time, however, 
integration efforts are severely harmed and seeds for long-term discontent are sown. The 
perception of Muslims as the enemy has resulted in government sanctioned restrictions on Islamic 
religious practices from limitations on establishing places of worship to bans on specific religious 
dresses (Cesari 2012: 437).  
 
This research will focus on examining the implications restrictions on the Islamic veil, more 
specifically the full-face veil or burqa as referred to in this research, have on radicalisation and 
terrorist activity in Europe. The next section will introduce existing research conducted on the 
topic. 
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5. Literature Review  
 
5.1. What Do We Know Already?  
 
This section will take a look at the existing research on burqa bans and terrorism and radicalisation 
to establish what is said about the bans and most importantly what does the research community 
already know about the link between burqa ban and terrorism and radicalisation. Since the aim of 
this study is to examine the effects of a burqa ban on radicalisation and terrorist activity, this thesis 
paper will contribute to both, the existing literature on the legislation restricting women’s use of 
the Islamic full-veil and the literature examining the causes of terrorism. As burqa bans in Europe 
are largely affecting people with immigrant background and due it often being discussed, debated 
or regulated in the wider context of immigration policy, this research will also add to the existing 
body of literature focusing on immigration and migration studies.  
 
In addition to exploring the existing literature on the topic of burqa bans and terrorism, the purpose 
of this section is to situate this particular research as part of the existing scholarship on this issue 
and to identify gaps in the existing literature that this research aims to fill. In addition, by going 
through what is already written and which kind of arguments have been made by academics and 
researchers, I will provide necessary academic support for the argument presented in this study 
and justifications for my choice to treat burqa ban as both a security issue and a counterterrorism 
measure, even though from the legal and political point of view it has not always been framed as 
such. The following sections will, however, provide support for the choices made when 
formulating the argument and research design of this thesis.  
 
The section is divided into two subsections; the first one will explore the arguments and findings 
made by academics who have written about burqa bans, and the second part will offer a review of 
the existing research on how hard line government policies, indiscriminate counterterrorism 
measures and minority discrimination are linked to the level of terrorist activity or radicalisation 
in a country. The first section examining burqa bans is further divided into three subsections in 
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order to highlight the central themes and core question featured in the existing literature. The first 
subsection will feature literature focusing on the implications burqa bans have on women’s rights 
and the second section introduces arguments with national security and threat centred approach. 
The last section will introduce research where the security implications of a burqa ban are more 
explicitly examined.  
 
 
5.2. Burqa Bans in the Literature 
 
The burqa ban has attracted quite a comprehensive body of researchers and academics to examine 
and write about it in recent years. Most of the existing research focuses on analysing either the 
debate surrounding the issue and the arguments made in favour of a ban (eg. Yasmeen 2013) or 
the civil, minority and human rights implications of the ban. Several papers have taken on the 
argument made in favour of the ban liberating and empowering oppressed Muslim women (e.g. 
Ferracioli 2013; Idriss 2016). In addition, a number of papers have analysed the possible security 
implications implementing a ban on burqas might cause (Madu 2015; Idriss 2016, Beydoun 2016, 
Cesari 2009, 2012). Surveys and interviews where Muslim women have been asked about the 
larger implications of the bans, how they have affected their lives and whether they think it’s a 
useful way to advance integration have been popular research methods and a bulk of the existing 
research features France as the case study or a reference case due to the country having adopted 
both a hijab ban in schools and a blanket ban on burqas.  
 
 
5.2.1. Burqa Ban as a Champion of Women’s Rights?  
 
When it comes to either public or political debate about women wearing the burqa, niqab or hijab, 
gender equality and women’s rights is often one of the biggest arguments made in favour of 
restricting its use in the West, and sometimes abroad as well. In Western societies, the Islamic 
full-face veil is often seen as a representation of Islam’s oppression of women and the traditionalist 
patriarchal culture where women lack basic civil and human rights (e.g. Yasmeen 2013:255—256; 
Honicker 2014: 271). Van Gulik (14.3.2009, Human Rights Watch) writes that to some people 
“wearing a headscarf is inherently demeaning.” Proponents of a ban argue that by banning the 
garment altogether or restricting its use, Muslim women will be liberated as they are no longer 
forced to wear the veil by their husbands or fathers (e.g. Nanwani 2011: 5). Chesler (2010: 33—
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34, 43—45.) for example calls the burqa a “moving prison” and argues that the garment represents 
subordination of women. She also claims that in addition to being harmful to the wearer, the sight 
of a women clad in burqa can be demoralizing and frightening to others. She argues in favour of 
burqa bans by stating that the garment is not religious but rather a political statement carrying 
Islamist sentiments and that the it is a threat to the Western society, way of living and even liberal 
democracy.  
 
While women being forced to wear the burqa is a valid and serious concern, countering arguments 
often point out that some women choose to wear the full-veil (Amnesty International 2012: 91—
100). Howard (2012: 153) has examined the different reasons for which Muslim women and girls 
wear the hijab or niqab or burqa, and even though one the reasons was pressure from the family 
or community, women may also choose to wear them as an ethnic or religious signal, as an 
affirmation of identity and as a “political act or a sign of a new and radical interpretation of one’s 
faith.” Killian (2003: 572) has found that for younger women, wearing a headscarf is in some 
cases a symbol of difference and of the pride they feel of their ethnic identity or a way to reaffirm 
and reclaim their ethnic identity. Howard (2012: 155-156) further argues that banning hijabs and 
full-face veils and other religious symbols is just as “paternalistic and oppressive of women as 
forcing them to wear these”. Oppression cannot be uprooted by forcing the victims to behave in a 
certain way through restricting legislation. Fighting for women’s rights and women’s freedom to 
make their own decision by taking away their autonomy and ability to choose to wear the full-
face veil goes against the very core principles of gender equality (Van Gulik 14.3.2009).  
 
Croucher (2008: 199—200) also finds that to Muslims the Islamic veil or hijab is a fundamental 
part of their identity. In his research, Muslims describe the hijab as being “an important and salient 
symbol of Islam that runs counter to France’s concept of secularism or laïcité.” Moreover, he 
writes that French Muslims see regulations like the 2004 ban on headscarves as France’s attempts 
to control Muslim identity and forcefully assimilate the population to the mainstream French 
society. Multiple research papers also note that in some cases the ban has had reverse effects when 
women who previously did not wear the full-veil started to don the garment as a protest against 
the state regulated ban (e.g. Idriss 2016: 131; Croucher 2008: 200).  
 
For the purposes of this research, it is important to take note of the political and identity aspect of 
the hijab or burqa. The fact that women consider wearing them as part of their ethnic or religious 
identity or as a way of political protest against the government imposing dress codes on them 
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(Howard 2012), is of particular importance when arguing that burqa ban has a radicalising effect 
on wider Muslim population or community. These findings indicate that the burqa or hijab has a 
larger meaning in the Muslim society. It’s about politics, culture, identity, ethnicity and religion, 
and a ban on these garments can be interpreted as an attempt to ban or restrict or silence everything 
that the garment represents. The importance of acknowledging the power of identity is highlighted 
in Beydoun’s (2006) research, where he cautions that pitting the French identity against Islam 
risks further widening the societal divide and playing straight into the hands of Islamic State who 
in its propaganda promotes the idea of “clash of civilisations” and Western war against Islam 
(Beydoun 2016: 1334). These observations form the base for the argument analysed in this 
research paper.   
 
When it comes to liberating women, the overarching theme in the existing research literature 
seems to argue that instead of liberating women, the bans serve to restrict them even further. For 
example, Ferracioli (2013: 90) has examined the justifications made in defence of the burqa ban 
and concludes that a ban does not in itself protect women’s authority. She also notes that 
proponents of the ban often fail to show how exactly the burqa or niqab oppresses the women 
wearing them and why banning them altogether would be the best way to help the oppressed 
women. Turner (2007: 295), Nanwani (2011: 8) and Freedman (2007: 29) argue that instead of 
liberating the allegedly oppressed women, a legislation sanctioning the use of the full-veil only 
serves to immobilise and restrict women more by isolating them to the private sphere of their 
homes. Idriss (2016: 124) supports these arguments by writing, that a state imposed dress code 
undermines the authority of Muslim women. The French laws restricting the use of headscarves 
and full-face veils are also argued to have the effect of isolating Muslims entirely to the private 
space by regulating what is allowed in the public space (Amiraux 2016: 40).  
 
In her article about the Afghan women and the “War on Terror” Lila Abu-Lughod (2002: 785, 
786) questions the Western liberal quest to liberate oppressed Muslim women. According to her, 
opposing the policies of states forcing a certain dress code on women should not lead to 
interpretation of veiling as inherently evil and sign of women’s unfreedom. By simply denouncing 
the burqa or niqab as a “medieval imposition” and representation of gender inequality, critics often 
strip Muslim women of their agency and reduce their diverse situations, backgrounds and cultural 
and religious beliefs to a single item of clothing. She further argues that the Westerners need to 
remember to respect diversity and difference and accept the fact that, in the case of Afghan women, 
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even after being “liberated” they might choose to do some things differently than we would want 
them to (Abu-Lughod 2002: 783).  
 
 
5.2.2. The Islamic Veil as a Security Threat 
 
As mentioned above, the justifications made in support of the burqa bans often stress the need to 
integrate immigrants better into European society and that burqas and niqabs hinder or even 
prevent sufficient integration of women (e.g. Freedman 2007: 29). This is because the burqa is 
seen as a representation of Islam, Islamic culture and traditionalist way of life where religion has 
a significant role in individual’s life. Burqa and niqab are quite visibly representing the difference 
between Muslims and others (Yasmeen 2013: 251). According to Edmunds (2012: 67, 73) 
religious symbols such as hijab or niqab become risks and even threats to national security when 
wearing them is interpreted as refusal to comply with the rules of secularism.   
 
Immigration and counterterrorism policies across Europe in recent years have been heavily 
influenced by the growing association between Muslims and violence (Bleich 2009: 273) 
Sometimes the adoption of new legislation or hardening stances on immigration have been directly 
preceded by violent acts perpetrated by immigrants or Muslims and this has been admitted or 
acknowledged by the decision-makers to have influenced their actions. The 2004 ban on 
headscarves in French schools serves as a perfect example of this kind of legislation (Bleich 2009: 
273, 372). Bleich (2009: 375) also acknowledges the provocative power of terrorist incidents in 
stating that any future attacks in Europe associated with religious motives could have the power 
to motivate new tougher policies or further restrictions on current regulations.    
 
Politicisation of religion as well as Securitization of Islam and the burqa have been major themes 
in the research literature, whether explicitly articulated (e.g. Mavelli 2013) or simply phrased in 
the form of the threat and fear guiding political decision decision-making (Bleich 2009), as 
illustrated above. Securitization can be understood as an extreme version of politicisation, 
“security” being the move that makes the issue something that is above politics or special politics. 
Politicisation, simply put, means that an issue becomes part of public policy agenda and requires 
government regulating. Securitization, on the other, means that an issue is “presented as an 
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds 
of political procedure.” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 23—24). When it comes to Islam, 
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securitization of Islam implies that Islam is presented to the public as an existential threat that 
needs extreme measures to be taken care of or contained. When the issue, or in this case Islam, 
becomes securitized, special politics or extreme measures are always justified due to the 
existential threat posed by the issue.  
 
Mavelli (2013: 159-160) writes about securitization of Islam in the European and Western 
societies, and notes that the idea that Islam poses an existential threat to the Western way of life 
and the fear stemming from it has led to the adoption of emergency measures and anti-terrorism 
legislation that disproportionately affects the Muslim minorities. He also notes that this same fear 
has been employed to carve up support and justify the attempts to restrict Muslim women from 
wearing headscarves and full-face veils across Europe. Fox and Akbaba (2015: 178) support this 
argument and write that the perceived extraordinary threat posed by Islam has legitimised policy 
responses that impose more control and scrutiny over Islam and undermines the freedoms and 
rights of Muslims on the grounds of national security. These go beyond what would otherwise be 
acceptable in Western democracies. Cesari (2012: 431) examines the political consequences of 
the “War on Terror” on the status of Islam in Europe, and argues that the restrictions of religious 
activities and practices are outcomes of securitization process constructing Islam as an existential 
threat.   
  
Edmunds (2012: 67—68) calls bans on religious clothing or on building of minarets a form of 
‘hyper-legalization’ of perceived threats to western culture. Pratt (2015: 205—206) on the other 
hand has argued that extreme responses, such as the Swiss ban on building minarets, to what is 
perceived a too strong presence of Islam in Western countries is caused by extremist Islamist acts 
that have been associated with Islam as a whole. According to this idea of reactionary extremism, 
the graphic images of atrocities committed by extremist organisations like Islamic State or Boko 
Haram create a sense of threat that Islam and Muslims are posing to the Western society. This is 
then perpetuated by the increasingly visible presence of Islam in Europe and North America. Pratt 
(2015: 206) further argues that Islamist extremism evokes an Islamophobic reaction through 
which acts perpetrated by militants become associated with Islam in general and all Muslims 
around us.  
 
The Islamic dress has become heavily politicised in contemporary European society, which is 
highlighted by the fact that only a very small fraction of Muslim women wear burqas or niqabs, 
but for some reason they have become the embodiment of the threat Islam poses to the West 
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(Edmunds 2012: 75). Edmunds (2012: 75) further argues that European governments are 
increasingly linking headscarves and veils with terror and continues with the observation that 
attempts to curtail Muslim women’s rights to choose how they wish to dress have increased 
especially in the wake of large scale terrorist attacks in New York 2001, Madrid 2004 and London 
2005. This further strengthens the argument made also in this research that the bans are 
increasingly about security. Cesari (2012: 431, 447) also argues that European Muslims are often 
seen as “foreign enemies” and that the increase of burqa bans is directly related to the perception 
of assertive Muslims as an enemy. Doyle (2011: 475, 483) supports these arguments by writing 
that due to the Western inability to understand Islamic faith and the tendency to interpret 
radicalised expressions of faith as synonymous to Islamist terrorism, the burqa and niqab have 
become targets of Islamophobia since they are visible representations of the Islamic culture that 
is thought to constitute a threat to the future of Europe.   
 
The perception of Muslims and Islam as a threat to the West is also examined in Carland’s (2011) 
research which is based on the idea about “fear of loss of freedom” in Western liberal societies, 
which leads to and feeds Islamophopic sentiments, which in turn leads to loss of freedom for 
Muslim women in the West. Fear creates fear. The French burqa ban is an example of this chain: 
France fears its liberal society and basic freedoms are threatened or under attack by the fact of 
Muslim women wearing the burqa, so they ban it. The consequent debate surrounding the burqa 
ban leads to increased Islamophobia which in turn leads to Muslim women fearing a loss of their 
freedom, as wearing the veil in today’s Europe comes with the fear of being subjected to 
sanctioning or abuse (Carland 2011: 472).  
 
Nanwani (2011: 7) writes that in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq the concerns 
over terrorism in France has lead the state to treat its Muslim population in the “context of 
heightened security” and discrimination, which has been manifested for example in reactions 
towards the headscarf and full-face veil. When it comes to public safety, there is no proven 
evidence that full-face veils in European public spaces pose a risk, which means that the argument 
made in favour of that aspect lose credibility (Nanwani 2011: 8). Scott (2007: 3) has suggested to 
some Western states banning the hijab or full-veil is a symbolic gesture that represents them taking 
a stand against Islam and the perceived threat it poses to national integrity and harmony.    
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5.2.3. Implications of the Burqa Ban on Terrorism  
 
Even though the securitization of Islam in general has been discussed in multiple research papers, 
the actual radicalizing effects of a burqa ban have been examined by only a handful of researchers. 
Idriss (2016), Beydoun (2016), Cesari (2009, 2012) and Madu (2015) are to my knowledge the 
only ones drawing a link between legislation restricting the use of Islamic veil and radicalisation 
or terrorism, and arguing that a ban might serve as a radicalising factor.  
 
In his research about the human rights implications a French style burqa ban would have in the 
UK, Idriss (2016: 126-129) stresses the security implications of the bans by arguing that a burqa 
ban might actually be counterproductive by marginalising an already unpopular minority group 
even further, which in the long run might lead to radicalisation. According to him, a burqa ban 
could be harmful for integration because it may contribute to feelings of discrimination, risk 
polarising a society even further and undermining social cohesion (Idriss 2016: 129). This 
supports the argument made in this study. Cesari (2009: 1) describes the securitization of Islam in 
Europe as European states both “fearing and fostering radicalisation.” While attempting to take 
steps towards reassuring their citizens that the threat of terrorism is taken seriously and being 
contained, the politicisation of religion leads Muslims fearing for the survival of their religion and 
religious rights and feeling resentful of the state’s interference. As a result, “the measures intended 
to prevent radicalization engender discontent and prompt a transformation of religious 
conservatism to fundamentalism” (Cesari 2009: 1).  
 
Beydoun (2016: 1273) argues that the hard line cultural assimilation approach adopted by France 
undermine advancements made in vital Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy goals. He 
proposes that the in order to meaningfully advance its counterterrorism and counter extremism 
goals France needs to curtail its hard-line cultural assimilation policies, such as the headscarf and 
full-face veil bans (2016: 1273-1274). Beydoun (2016: 1280-81) further argues that in France the 
cultural assimilation and counterterrorism policy are practically synonymous for the Muslim 
population and that the hijab and burqa bans are the symbolic and structural cornerstones of the 
cultural assimilationist and counterterrorism model. Beydoun (2016: 1333) also argues that the 
French government risks exposing the French Muslims with dissident political views and making 
them vulnerable to the propaganda and recruiting attempts of the Islamic State if it continues to 
target Muslims at large in their counterterrorism activities.  
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Madu’s (2015) PhD thesis represent to my knowledge the only attempt, as off yet, to examine the 
effect burqa ban has on Islamist terrorist activity. Her analysis did not support the hypothesised 
correlation between the French burqa ban and increased acts of Islamist terrorism, however, she 
points out that the ban has the potential to exacerbate tensions between the French Government 
and the Muslim community which in turn could have implications on Islamist terrorism. The 
findings supported her theoretical argument about the underlying conflict, or “clash of 
civilizations”, between “some Western countries” and Islam. She found that although the French 
Muslims she interviewed said the burqa is not a religious requirement in Islam, it is still an 
important aspect of the religion. She also found that her interviewees felt that the burqa ban in 
France undermines and challenges Islam (Madu 2015: 157), which is also a significant finding in 
support of the argument and theoretical framework employed in this research.   
 
This research will build on these findings. However, instead of solely focusing on analysing how 
the Muslim community interprets the ban, this research will take a wider and more comprehensive 
look at the society and treat the burqa ban as something that affects the wider Muslim community, 
not only those who are directly affected. The burqa ban then has instrumental value in creating 
preconditions (Crenshaw 1981) for radicalisation. While different security implications have been 
explored in previous research and even though an initial attempt at examining the link between 
the burqa ban and Islamist terrorism was made in Madu’s (2015) research, a comprehensive 
theory-based analysis of the effect of the legislation on radicalisation and terrorism is yet to be 
conducted. This study will aim at filling this gap in the existing literature.  
 
 
 
5.3. Terrorism and Radicalisation in the Literature 
 
As noted above, the burqa ban can be understood as a specific form of discrimination. Even though 
the link between burqa bans and terrorism remains a topic that has attracted very little research, 
the effects of various types of discrimination on terrorist activity have been well documented. This 
section will introduce existing academic literature analysing the relationship between hard-line or 
indiscriminate counterterrorism policies, discrimination and terrorism and radicalisation. The 
findings will provide support and background for the argument analysed in this research and help 
in the formation of the theoretical argument by situating this research in the context of existing 
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research on the relationship between government policies and terrorist mobilisation. The first 
subsection will introduce the relevant terrorism literature and the second subsection will examine 
what is said about radicalisation.  
 
 
5.3.1. Government Actions and Terrorism  
 
Various case studies examining the effect minority discrimination has on individual terrorist 
movements and campaigns have determined that discrimination is a major factor in predicting 
terrorist activity (e.g. Bradley 2006; Van De Voorde 2005; Whittaker 2001). Crenshaw (1981: 
381, 385), Ross (1993: 322) and Piazza (2011: 339) have linked minority dissatisfaction and 
grievances faced by minority groups with terrorism and the outbreak of political violence.  
 
Piazza (2012: 521) has examined the relationship between minority discrimination and terrorist 
attacks. Through an analysis focusing on political participation and repression, economic status 
and religious and language rights he found that socioeconomic discrimination against minorities 
is a linked to the occurrence of terrorism. The idea of minority discrimination or a threat faced by 
a distinctive group of people is also present in McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2008) research. They 
have determined that group identification is usually essential element in radicalisation as 
radicalisation tends to occur as a reaction to an issue or an actor perceived to pose threat to the in-
group (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008: 415).  
 
Araj (2008: 284) on the other hand found harsh state repression to be a major cause of suicide 
bombing. This is supported by Piazza (2017: 102) who argues that state repression increases the 
amount of domestic terrorist activity in a country because it closes off nonviolent avenues of 
dissent and exacerbates discontent and group grievances. He found that countries with prominent 
political and economic discrimination against ethnic minorities are more likely to experience 
terrorism than countries without discriminatory policies (Piazza 2017: 106). He further singles out 
religious discrimination as a significant factor in determining which countries face terrorist attacks 
ad which not (Piazza 2017: 112). Piazza (2017: 114) also denounces the academic papers claiming 
that state repression would raise the cost of violent extremism and lead to decrease in terrorist 
attacks. He found that repression overall is a stimulant of domestic terrorism within countries.  
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Choi and Piazza (2016: 39) find that domestic terrorism is more likely in countries in which certain 
ethnic populations are excluded from political power. They conclude that “ethnic group political 
exclusion is more consistent and substantive predictor of domestic terrorist activity than general 
political repression or economic discrimination.” Jessica Stern (2016: 105) also supports the 
discrimination argument by suggesting that both trauma exposure and discrimination tend to be 
associated with support for activism in general, both violent and non-violent. In addition, she 
suggests that a correlation exists between social marginalization and individual’s support for 
violent activism such as radical interpretations of Islam.  
 
In their research focusing on indiscriminate counterterrorism measures and subsequent 
Provisional IRA (PIRA) bomb attacks, Gill, Piazza and Horgan (2016: 473) found that 
indiscriminate counterterrorism killings in the Northern Ireland between 1970-1998 increased 
PIRA bombings overall and prompted PIRA to specifically target civilians in Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED) attacks. Lyall (2009: 332) on the other hand has examined the effect 
indiscriminate state response has on insurgent violence in Chechnya and he found that 
indiscriminate violence reduced the number of subsequent violent insurgent attacks.  
 
Woodworth (2001: 2) conducted interview among the Basque population in her quest to 
understand the ETA violence. She writes that “ETA’s actions are seen almost as a force of nature, 
an inevitable response to a politically intolerant situation” and further argues that “Nothing 
radicalizes a people faster than unleashing of undisciplined security forces on its towns and 
villages. The litany of beatings, torture, and unpunished shootings that follows becomes a 
recruiting catechism for an armed resistance group” (Woodworth 2001: 6). Rosendorf and Sandler 
(2010: 443-445) also examine the backlash effect as a reaction to too harsh pre-emptive actions 
by the government. They argue that the backlash arises when heavy-handed proactive or pre-
emptive measures carried out by the government create new grievances among the population 
terrorists are perceived to be part of and increase the support for the terrorists’ agenda.  
 
 
 
 
5.3.2. Identity, Social Networks and Radicalisation   
  
Radicalisation and home-grown terrorism have become the buzzwords of the terrorism debate in 
Europe. For Western countries, the threat of terrorism comes increasingly from the “inside” in the 
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form of “home grown” terrorists radicalised in the West (Sageman 2008: 71). Dalgaard-Nielsen 
(2010: 798-799) observes that that home-grown terrorism is a real problem in Europe, where ever 
younger Europeans have become radicalised in a very short period of time. Moreover, socio-
economic deprivation or lack of education do not seem to be the main explaining attributes for 
individual’s radicalisation anymore (Bakker 2006: 36—38; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 799). Roy 
(2007: 55) writes that Islamic radicalisation in Europe today is a youth movement where 
frustration is playing a key role. Roy (2007) and Khosrokhvar (2005) are among the researchers 
who have argued radical Islam often offers a way for increasingly Westernized young Muslims to 
create a meaningful and distinctive identity for themselves. Through radicalisation they can 
reconstruct their self-image (Roy 2007:55). Radicalisation then arises out of a feeling of non-
belonging, failure and rejection (Khosrokhavar 2005: 185; Roy 2007: 55-56).  
 
Search for meaning and identity are also strong attributes in Sageman’s (2004) and Wiktorowicz 
(2004) studies on radicalisation and recruitment. However, they base their arguments more on the 
idea that radicalisation is about social networks, pre-existing ties and relationships through which 
people searching for an identity, community and a sense of belonging become radicalised. 
According to Sageman (2004: 152) and Horowitz (2015: 71, 80) social networks and ties play a 
key role in terrorist recruitment, and in determining who becomes a terrorist. Social ties and peer 
pressure then reinforce the emerging commitment of the new recruit. Local ties, networks and 
connections are also found to be necessary prerequisites for individuals to mobilise for violence 
(Varshney 2001: 363; Fujii 2008: 568), as individuals often need to have at least some sense of 
shared identity in order to mobilise for common action (Tilly 2003: 31).  
 
This is also shared by Neumann and Rogers (2007: 16, 71) who found that social bonding can 
facilitate the adaption of more extreme worldviews. Grievances and discontent do not 
automatically lead to action. Radicalisation is a social process through which the individual 
become more receptive to the radical ideals and gradually sympathetic to the terrorist agenda. 
During the process “the individual is gradually convinced that the perceived injustices require the 
individual to engage personally and that violence is religiously sanctioned” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 
2010: 803). Roy (2007: 55) also finds that radicalisation seems to often occur in a small local 
group of friends who met in university, though a participation in a gang or in jail.  
 
Socialization, shared identity, and pre-existing social networks are also essential for the terrorist 
recruiters when determining who to accept as a new member (Hegghammer 2012: 3-6; Weinstein 
	 31	
2005: 600-601). Joining a terrorist organisation might prove difficult for a potential recruit if he 
or she has no existing links to anyone inside the movement. Friends, family members, and relatives 
often join terrorist organisations together, and when someone in a group makes a connection, the 
others have a “trusted way in” through an existing link (Sageman 2004: 142-143, 152; Horowitz 
2015: 80). Leiken and Brooke (2006: 512) also note that when it comes to global Jihad, instead of 
recruiting new members based on skills, members with existing social linkages are preferred.  
 
In majority of the radicalisation literature presented above, the central theme and arguments 
circled around the idea that young European Muslims become radicalised through an identity and 
belonging seeking process as a reaction to perceived hostility from the majority society (Dalgaard-
Nielsen 2010: 803). Even though majority of the researcher claim that radicalisation is a social 
process and does not happen as a direct reaction of grievances, it seems, however, that during the 
social process the chosen identity is formed as a reaction to the perceived Western hostility or 
inability to provide opportunities for a fulfilling and meaningful life. Islamists frequently frame 
their activities as being legitimate responses to Western aggression and attempts to undermine 
Islamic culture (Wiktorowicz 2004: 8, 11; Khosrokhavar 2005: 184).  
 
Terrorists are usually not insane, crazy or suffering from neurological disorders. This has long 
been established by the research community (Horgan 2003: 7; Borum 2004: 3). Sageman for 
example argues that people do not become radicalised due to psychological disorders but by the 
people surrounding them, through their existing social networks. Sageman (2004), Wiktorowicz 
(2004), Bakker (2006) and Hegghammer (2012) all argue that radicalisation is about who you 
know. The importance of existing networks become an increasingly prominent channel for 
radicalisation for disenfranchised European youth who are seeking a sense of belonging and 
identity in the crosswinds of the Western liberal culture they grew up surrounded by and their 
parents’ generations’ more traditional culture that still holds onto the culture of their home 
countries and communities. Socioeconomic explanations and lack of education as a catalyst for 
radicalisation are unable to account for the whole extensive phenomenon. However, even though 
on the individual level radicalisation and mobilisation for terrorist violence is a sum of a variety 
of attributes, this study leans on the argument that on the society level, grievances constitute the 
primary cause of terrorism. The theoretical argument build around the grievances based approach 
will be introduced next.  
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According to a research by Change Institute (2008: 97, 120—121) even though a large majority 
of the European Muslims denounce terrorism and the ideology of violent militant Islamism, the 
existing grievances and societal problems are still widely shared among the Muslim population. 
This offers the terrorist organisations a way in, a receptive audience for their propaganda messages. 
According to Milton et al. (2013) individuals whose personal experience closely resonates with 
the terrorist propaganda are more likely to join terrorist organisations. This observation provides 
support for the theoretical argument presented in this study. The study further cautions against 
implementing counterterrorism policies that could risk adding to the existing grievances, which 
the militants could then exploit (Change Institute 2008: 97, 120). This point will be further 
examined in this research. 
  
As shown above, the impact of hard-line counterterrorism measures or discriminative policies on 
radicalisation and terrorism has been examined in a number of research papers. However, there 
seems to be very little research conducted on counterterrorism measures and their impact on 
radicalisation in Europe specifically. Idriss (2016), Beydoun (2016) and Madu (2015) analysed to 
some extend the effects of a burqa ban on terrorist activity or indicated that a ban would risk 
isolating Muslim minorities even further and in the end lead to increased radicalisation. In the 
context of increasing number of European states adopting bans on the full-face veil, the topic 
needs to be research further and comprehensive analysis of the effects of the bans on radicalisation 
and terrorist activity needs to be conducted. This research aims to fill this gap by drawing a direct 
link between a ban on the full-face veils and radicalisation and terrorism, and by aiming to 
examine whether the ban has indeed led to increased radicalisation. The following section will 
introduce the theoretical framework to support the argument.  
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6. Theoretical Framework   
 
6.1. Why People Mobilise for Violence? 
 
Asymmetrical conflict has for the longest time provided a conundrum for conflict researchers. 
What motivates people to join armed rebellion? What drives insurgencies? What makes people 
mobilise for violence against stronger and more capable government forces? Or, in the European 
context, what radicalises young Europeans to the point that they are willing to join violent 
extremist organisations? Rebellions, insurgencies and civil wars are often based on unbalanced 
distribution of capabilities. By the logic of state’s monopoly on violence, rebels and opposition 
forces are often considered significantly weaker that the incumbent regime, which makes the 
conflict asymmetrical (Lake 2002: 20—21). Same logic applies to terrorist organisations. The 
questions remain. “Why does high individual risk not deter participation in rebellion?” (Kalyvas 
and Kocher 2007: 177). 
 
When it comes to rebellion and civil war, and terrorism, the common agreement amongst the 
academics acknowledges that rebels face an acute collective action problem. This is due to the 
asymmetrical nature of the conflict, but also because the opposition, and in case of terrorism, the 
extremist organisations are often more radical and hold more hostile views about the regime than 
majority of the population or a subgroup (e.g. Kydd and Walter 2006: 69—70; Lake 2002: 18).  
 
This research will employ the collective action problem paradigm as a theoretical framework to 
examine the implications of restrictive legislation on radicalisation in Europe. The collective 
action paradigm has formed the theoretical base for a multitude of conflict and civil war research 
and the same causal chains and theoretical logic have also been applied to terrorism research in 
explaining why terrorist organisations do what they do. This research will combine these two 
bodies of literature, especially the strategic logic of terrorism as a provocation explored by Kydd 
and Walter (2006) and Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) to test whether the effect of burqa 
bans on radicalisation in France can be explained by the logic provided by provocation strategy.  
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The theoretical argument tested in this study assumes that terrorists are mobilised to violence 
because of grievances. However, grievances are not always enough to mobilise the masses, and 
to overcome this collective action problem terrorist organisations rely on terrorist tactics to 
provoke the enemy regime to respond to a terrorist attack by indiscriminately targeting a whole 
population or a group of people they perceive the terrorists to represent. This in turn will radicalise 
the moderates and cause more people to swing their allegiance to the terrorists’ side. For the 
purposes of this research, the focus in on the government’s response and the hypothesized 
radicalising effect it will have on larger population. In this research, the legislation restricting 
women’s use of the full-face veil will be treated as the indiscriminate counterterrorism response.  
 
The causal chain briefly introduced above will be formed in three parts; the first part will explain 
how grievances experienced by a group of people can lead to violence. The second part will 
introduce the collective action problem the rebels and terrorists alike need to overcome in order 
to gain new members and successfully proceed with their violent campaign. The logic of 
provocation strategy and the role it plays in overcoming the collective action problem and in 
mobilising people for violence is introduced in the third part. The third part also explains the 
reasoning behind the argument that hard-line counterterrorism measures increase terrorism, which 
also forms the base of the argument presented in this research.  
 
 
6.2. Grievances as Drivers for Violence  
 
Another often explored question is why terrorists do what they do. According to Kydd and Walter 
(2006: 50) terrorist organisations engage in terrorism because it works and frequently delivers the 
response they desired. Multiple definitions of terrorism agree that it is a way of seeking political 
goals by instilling fear and costs on the target audience, which is often larger that the immediate 
target of an attack (Enders et al. 2011; Tilly 2004; Hoffman 1998).  Terrorism is often portrayed 
as irrational activity aiming at spreading fear. While fear is an essential factor in terrorism, it is 
not usually the end goal, but a means to reach the goal. Terrorism works because it causes people 
and governments to respond in a way that serves the terrorist organisations’ cause (Kydd and 
Walter 2006: 50). Terrorism in itself then is a means to reach the end goal, which also indicates 
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that for terrorist organisations, engaging in terrorism is not irrational but a strategic tool (Lake 
2002: 15) to seek change in society.  
 
Terrorism research has traditionally focused on explaining the occurrence of terrorism based on 
domestic attributes (see e.g. Wilson and Piazza 2013; Enders and Sandler 2006; Findley and 
Young 2011; Piazza 2008). The existing research has determined regime type to have significant 
effect on either promoting or reducing terrorist activity (Li 2005; Wilson and Piazza 2013; 
Chenoweth 2013). Unstable regimes are found to be more vulnerable to terrorism (e.g. Li, 2005) 
and failed states more likely to host terrorist groups, have their nationals to participate in terrorism 
and to be targets of attacks themselves (Piazza 2008). The link between economic performance 
and terrorism remains contested since some researchers argue that economically advanced 
countries are more likely to experience terrorism because they provide more targets (Blomberg 
and Hess 2008; Piazza 2011) while others have found positive relationship between poverty and 
terrorism (Choi and Luo 2013). Migration is also found to be a strong factor in determining 
terrorism occurrence. Bove and Böhmelt (2016), Choi and Salehyan (2013), Milton et al. (2013), 
and Leiken and Brooke (2006) all conclude that there is a connection between migration and 
refugee flows, and terrorism.  
 
Group grievances have been presented as one of the key drivers of terrorism and rebellion (Boylan 
2014: 5). Grievances can be social, political or economic and are usually felt among “an 
identifiable subgroup of a larger population”. An ethnic minority being discriminated against by 
the majority is a typical example of group grievances. Exclusion from political power of one group 
by another one is another example (Crenshaw 1981: 383). Grievances alone can’t explain why 
some countries are more prone to conflict than others (see e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003: 75), 
however, in general for individuals and groups to feel unsatisfied with their government, there 
need to be some antagonisms in the society (Gurr 1970: 9). Crenshaw (1981: 384) argues that the 
existence of concrete grievance among an identifiable subgroup is a precondition and a direct 
cause of terrorism. According to her, lack of opportunities for political participation forms the 
second precondition for terrorism and unusual use of force by government as a response to dissent 
another precipitant or permissive precondition that precedes terrorist incidents (Crenshaw 1981: 
383—385). Choi and Piazza (2016: 37) argue that for politically excluded minority groups, 
terrorist violence is a way to air their grievances. Oberschall (2004: 27) argues that a shared feeling 
of widespread discontent and dissatisfaction as the motivation for violent actions is what separates 
terrorist groups from criminals.  
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As mentioned earlier in this study, religious, socioeconomic and ethnic discrimination are found 
to be correlated with terrorism occurrence (Choi and Piazza 2016; Piazza 2017: 112). 
Discrimination and state repression lead to the formation of political grievances which makes the 
society more prone for conflict and terrorism. Political exclusion and collective economic 
deprivations faced by ethnic and religious subgroups makes political violence more likely in a 
society, when frustrated individuals and groups turn into violence to address their grievances 
(Choi and Piazza 2016: 37; Gurr 1970: 7—9). Shared experiences of grievances may lead the 
subgroup to develop an “enhanced sense of collective identity” and a strong sense of alienation 
from the perceived majority of the society, which in turn only further strengthens the group 
grievances. Exacerbated group grievances can then be exploited by opposition figures, rebels or 
terrorist groups to mobilise support for their cause (Choi and Piazza 2016: 41). 
 
Grievances that are left unheeded by the government can lead to support for or development of a 
social movement and in extreme cases a group or organisation that engages in terrorism to air the 
frustrations of the population or a subgroup (Ross 1993: 325—326). This is supported by Klausen 
(2006: 92—93) who finds that political and socioeconomic exclusion combined with increasing 
polarization in the society induces the feeling of alienation among European Muslim minority 
communities which provides fertile breeding ground for radicalisation and terrorist recruitment 
and drives support for the extremist cause. Stern (2016: 105) has also found that individuals who 
had experience discrimination were more likely to support “radical interpretation of Islam”.  
 
Crenshaw (1981) and Ross (1993) also argue that minority political exclusion is a particularly 
strong indicator of terrorism as regimes characterized by political exclusion are more likely to be 
targeted by terrorist groups. According to Stern (2016: 105, 108) “risk factors for radicalization 
and mobilization start with a grievance, more or less likely shared, often about some form of social 
injustice.” However, she also notes that this doesn’t mean that every person facing grievances is 
willing to take up arms and violently rebel against the government. “While terrorist groups 
capitalize on these socioeconomic frustrations, only a small portion of those that feel aggrieved 
will join” (Stern 2016: 108).   
 
State repression has been found to provoke mobilisation in support of the opposition and violent 
activities of the opposition (Boylan 2014: 5—6). While some researchers have argued that state 
repression decreases violence by increasing the cost of participating in rebellion (for discussion 
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see e.g. Eyerman 1998; Lichbach 1987) the argument supporting the grievances logic holds that 
state repression closes off nonviolent channels for seeking change and consequently, enhances the 
grievances felt by the population or a subgroup (Piazza 2017: 104). In the long run, state repression 
and especially increasingly repressive actions as a retaliation to violent incidents risk emboldening 
the insurgency in their quest for political change and subsequently through its repressive policies 
the state also risks mobilising more aggrieved people to join the terrorist or rebel side in protest 
(Boylan 2014: 6). This follows the logic of provocation strategy.  
 
 
6.3. Collective Action Problem  
 
Grievances and discontent do not, however, automatically lead to action. This is where the 
collective action problem enters the picture. Collective action problem arises when the shared 
grievances, values and goals are unsuccessful at mobilising majority of the people to join the 
rebellion or insurgency. Far more people often entertain radical ideas than are willing to face risks 
of actually mobilising for violence (Stern 2016: 104). When it comes to terrorist organisations this 
is even more of a reality since they are often considerably more radical and more hostile towards 
the target regime than majority of the people they claim to represent are (Kydd and Walter 2006: 
69).  
 
According to the collective action paradigm, people have the tendency to free-ride when it comes 
to the provision of public goods, because the costs are usually borne by the individuals while the 
benefits are collective and the same for everyone regardless of the price one paid for them 
individually (Kalyvas and Kocher 2002: 180). When it comes to insurgencies, non-participation 
is usually relatively costless. The possible cost for individual’s participation, on the other hand, is 
death. Relative to this, the cost of nonparticipation is usually considerably lower. Under this logic, 
the best option for everyone would be stay at home (Kalyvas and Kocher 2002: 180—181). 
 
Insurgencies, rebellions and terrorist movements need supporters and followers to sustain their 
activities. There will always be individuals with radical views willing to initiate an action, but 
violent opposition will not work without resources, followers and members willing to risk their 
lives for the cause. And these resources are significantly harder to find due to the high individual 
risk associated with participation (Kalyvas and Kocher 2002: 182).  
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In order to survive, terrorist organisations and insurgent groups need to overcome the pressing 
collective action problem and find incentives that are strong enough to mobilise the moderates for 
violence. In essence, they need to increase the individual costs for non-participation and decrease 
the opportunity cost for participation (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007: 366) While shared 
grievances do not automatically create incentives for individuals, they can be exploited by the 
extremists to radicalise members of the community and mobilise them for violent opposition. 
Jessica Stern (2016: 109) notes that for Islamic State “finding labor is less taxing when they can 
recruit from an existing pool of disenfranchised Muslims.” To expand this pool of frustrated and 
disenfranchised individuals, terrorist organisations can, often do, use terrorist tactics. This where 
the salience of provocation strategy comes in.  
 
 
6.4. Terrorism as a Provocation Strategy 
 
Terrorist attacks offer terrorist organisations, or rebel groups, a powerful tool for generating 
support for their cause and mobilising people for violence (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007: 
365). The logic of provocation assumes that terrorist organisations launch terrorist attacks to 
provoke the enemy, usually a government, into harsh and indiscriminate counterterrorism 
responses which target the whole population the terrorist organisation is deemed to represent. This 
would then radicalise and mobilise more people to support and join the extremists (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Dickson 2007: 365; Kydd and Walter 2006: 51, 69—70; Lake 2002: 16). In order 
to overcome the collective action problem, terrorist organisations need to alter the beliefs of their 
“domestic” audiences, meaning the population, group or sub-group of people they regard as their 
constituency, about the nature of the enemy government. Provocation as a strategy is designed to 
persuade the domestic audience that the target of attacks, which is usually a government, is 
unconcerned of their wellbeing and must be resisted (Kydd and Walter 2006: 51, 69; Lake 2002: 
16).  
 
Thornton (1964: 87), Crenshaw (1981: 385) and David Fromkin (1975: 683) all listed provocation 
as one of the strategies of terrorism, Fromkin even argued provocation to be the only strategy of 
terrorism. The logic behind provocation is, that indiscriminate violence targeting a whole group 
of people reduces or eliminates entirely, the collective action problem most terrorist and rebel 
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groups experience. This logic renders indiscriminate and too harsh counterterrorism measures 
counterproductive (Lyall 2009: 335). By getting provoked and punishing a larger group of people 
indiscriminately the government creates collateral damage, which creates a desire for revenge that 
in turn drives the moderates to support and join the terrorists (Lake 2002: 19).  
 
Crenshaw (1981: 385) notes that particularly harsh government actions as a response to dissent 
often set the stage for subsequent terrorist incidents. The “boomerang” or “backlash” effect of 
harsh counterterrorism measures have been acknowledged and modelled in several research 
papers examining the relationship between terrorist incidents and subsequent government 
response (e.g. Gill, Piazza and Horgan 2016: 475; Rosendorf and Sandler 2010: 443—445).  
 
History is also full of examples of provocation and the radicalising effects of harsh retaliation: 
9/11 attacks in the US and the War on Terror that followed being one on the most pressing ones 
with long lasting effects. According to Kydd and Walter (2006: 59) by targeting the heart of the 
American success story al-Qaida attempted to both increase the cost of the US presence in Saudi 
Arabia and, most importantly, provoke the United States and its allies into an extreme and 
indiscriminate military response that would radicalise the world’s Muslim population. 
 
In this study, bans on Islamic full-face veils are understood and treated as indiscriminate 
counterterrorism measures employed by European governments. European Muslims and Muslims 
in general, regardless of their geographical location, form the population or group of people the 
terrorist organisations are trying to radicalise and whose opinions they are trying to sway to 
accommodate more radical and extreme views. Following the theoretical framework laid out here, 
I argue that these same Muslims are also the ones the European governments are indiscriminately 
targeting by implementing restrictions on the use of the full-face veil.  
 
For the government side, countering the threat of terrorism usually entails two approaches: 
defensive and proactive. Defensive measures include hardening targets and taking steps towards 
making it harder for the terrorists to physically reach their targets and carry out successful attacks. 
Proactive measures on the other hand include actions such as pre-emptive strikes and military 
action against terrorist strongholds for the purpose of limiting and ultimately ending terrorist 
operations (Rosendorf and Sandler 2004: 657—658). Proactive operations, however, may have 
the downside of intensifying and creating more grievances, making the government lose support 
and empowering the terrorists and their message (Rosendorf and Sandler 2004: 658; Lyall 2009: 
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335). The provocation strategy aims at delegitimizing the government by revealing to the public 
how unconcerned the government is of their wellbeing (Kydd and Walter 2006: 50). This again 
works towards promoting terrorist recruitment.  
 
Extremist recruitment depends not only on the success of their terrorist attacks but also on the 
course the target government decides to take in responding to that attack. This is a crucial point 
to acknowledge in the context of the thesis paper at hand. Governments suffering from terrorist 
attacks or a credible threat of attacks are often left with an ungrateful task: something needs to be 
done to peace the public, but at the same time, they need to be careful in their response to avoid 
furthering any terrorist goals. Governments who respond too softly risk appearing weak in both 
their enemy’s and domestic audience’s eyes. Governments who respond with too much force risk 
alienating the moderates and encouraging the opposition. In Western liberal democracies, where 
the politicians are often worried about their re-election, the need to appease voting public often 
requires visible counter measures and tough responses, which are often the ones that will more 
likely serve the terrorists’ purpose (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007: 373—374; Rosendorf 
and Sandler 2004: 658—659; Kydd and Walter 2006: 70).  
 
Implementing effective counterterrorism strategies requires that the governments understand what 
drives terrorists to do what they do and what makes people to join them. When it comes to 
responding to terrorism, governments are often too quick to use the citizens fear of terrorist attacks 
to justify increased social control, which in the end might increase and encourage the very problem 
they are trying to address. Too hard pre-emptive measures could risk exacerbating the grievances 
in the society, which in turn gives extremist groups like Islamic State ammunition for recruitment 
because their message will be more resonant in an aggrieved society (Lain 2016: 386).  
 
Jessica Stern (23.3.2016, Boston Globe) has argued that besides attempting to build and expand 
its caliphate and goading Western states into war in Syria, Islamic State’s goal is to “eliminate 
what it calls the "gray zone" of moderate Islam” practiced by most Western Muslims. It aims at 
making these moderate Muslims feel unsafe in Western democracies as a result of discrimination 
and prejudice. Islamic State itself acknowledges this goal in its propaganda material, where it is 
stated that Islamic State attempts to eliminate this grey area by goading the enemy to target these 
grey areas to radicalise the moderates and sway their allegiance to the organisation (Dar al-Islam 
Issue 9: 65). This again follows the logic of provocation strategy.  
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In general, militant Islamism is built on a narrative according to which the West alongside with 
Israel and other corrupt regimes are at war with Islam. To overcome this aggression and 
humiliation, Muslims need to unite and fight the West and their corrupting influence in order to 
“return to a society of peace, harmony, and social justice” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 798). This is 
a message particularly appealing to the disenfranchised European youth who feel marginalised by 
theirs states and discriminated against by their fellow citizens. This observation brings us to the 
argument that will be tested in the following sections.  
 
Based on the theoretical framework built around provocation strategy and the backlash effect of 
indiscriminate counterterrorism actions by government, this study argues that by implementing 
legislation restricting Muslims women’s ability to wear the full-face veil European governments 
risk increasing grievances felt by European Muslim communities which increases radicalisation 
and terrorist activity. Based on the theoretical arguments provided above, the burqa ban can affect 
radicalisation and terrorist activity in two ways: by (1) increasing the grievances and discontent 
felt by the Muslim population directly through the direct effects it has on the Muslim women 
unable to wear the burqa anymore and through the symbolic power the dress carries as a 
representation of Islam, and by (2) providing the terrorist organisation with a propaganda and 
recruitment tool through which to strengthen their message about Western aggression against 
Islam. 
 
In the following sections, I will test the argument formulated above by analysing the implications 
of the French burqa ban though four different indicators. Based on the arguments and findings 
made in the previous literature examining the backlash effects of indiscriminate and harsh 
counterterrorism measures or repressive state practices and the support provided by the theoretical 
framework introduced above, the hypothesis of this study will assume that the burqa ban has an 
increasing effect on radicalisation and terrorist activity. This will be analysed in the following 
sections.  
 
Before proceeding to the research design and actual analysis part, it is important to note again that 
even through a burqa ban directly applies to only small number of women, and even though it is 
not a counterterrorism measure per se, the indiscriminate nature of the ban comes from the fact 
that the burqa is understood to be a representation of Islam, as argued elsewhere in this research. 
The symbolic nature of the full-veil has been acknowledged by Muslims and proponents of the 
ban alike, and it provides further support for the perception that by targeting the burqa, the 
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European governments are targeting Islam at large. In addition, there is no proof that Muslim 
women in Europe form any kind of security risk that would justify singling them out in a way the 
burqa ban does. This provides also support for the argument that the burqa ban constitutes a 
measure that aims at containing the European Muslim population at large.  
 
Also, when it comes to the main source of terrorism threat in Europe today, the radicalising effects 
of government counterterrorism actions are not limited or constrained by geography or national 
borders. Traditionally, the study of terrorism has distinguished between domestic and international 
terrorism. However, when it comes to Islamist extremist ideology promoted by groups like Islamic 
State and al-Qaida it is more feasible to talk about transnational terrorism that does not stop at any 
country’s borders. This is manifested by the fact that international terrorist organisations keep 
recruiting among the disaffected communities of Europe and that either attacks by international 
organisations are being directed from abroad and perpetrated and planned “at home” or attacks by 
lone-actors are inspired by the international organisations and their propaganda (Cesari 2012: 430). 
Following this logic, even though this study focuses only on analysing the effects European and 
French counterterrorism measures, the French burqa ban in particular, have had on radicalisation 
and terrorist activity in Europe and France, the larger Muslim audience cannot be excluded when 
discussing the implications of the ban.  
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7. Research Design  
 
7.1. Data Sources and Tools for Analysis 
 
The argument and hypothesis presented above will be tested by examining the effects of the burqa 
ban on a set of indicators chosen to help analyse the implications from four different angles. More 
substantive explanation and analysis of the legislation prohibiting the use of the full-veil in France 
and the wider political and historical context will also be included as part of the analysis. The unit 
of analysis in country, meaning that even though the analysis will also examine and analyse briefly 
the effects on an individual level, the main focus is to get a clear picture of the implications the 
ban has on the country level.  
 
To analyse the effects or implications of the ban on the country level, this study will employ four 
different indicators: Islamist terrorist activity, radicalisation measured as the number of foreign 
fighters originating from a country, the direct effects of the ban on Muslim women and finally, 
how the ban has been presented in extremist propaganda. The direct effects the ban has had on 
Muslim women has been employed in previous research on terrorism and radicalisation as well, 
most notably Madu (2015). The three other indicators, however, have not been used in analysing 
the implications of the burqa ban before, at least to my knowledge. In that sense, this research 
presents a unique attempt at examining the burqa ban through these four indicators.  
 
Islamist terrorist activity will be measured as the number of completed, failed and foiled Islamist 
terrorist attacks in France between 2006 and 2016. Initial comparisons between the five-year-
periods before and after the restrictive legislation took effect will be performed. However, due to 
the small number of actual attacks in Europe and France, drawing definitive inferences is not 
possible. The data comes from Europol’s European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports 
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(TE-SAT).1 Europol started collecting official terrorism statistics from the EU member states in 
2006, which has limited the time range of employed in this research as well.  
 
Radicalisation will be measured as the number of foreign fighters that have left France to join 
extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. A number of different institutions have collected data on 
foreign fighters, but this research will use the updated numbers provided in the Soufan Group 
report from 2015 (The Soufan Group 2015). The Soufan Group first provided estimates of the 
number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria in 2014, and their 2015 report updates those numbers. 
They use official government estimates when possible, but also draw numbers from UN reports, 
research reports and academic sources. Even when official, the numbers need to be treated with 
sufficient level of uncertainty, since many governments do not release figures and even those who 
do, might not be very accurate in their estimations. The governments might also have an incentive 
to either underestimate or overestimate the figures (The Soufan Group 2015). This study will use 
the official figures for consistency, and supplement them with the unofficial figure if needed, in a 
similar fashion as done in Benmelech and Klor (2016). The figure for France is an official estimate. 
For Europe, apart from Serbia, Montenegro and Portugal, all countries presented in the analysis 
section had official figures available. For the three countries mentioned above, unofficial 
estimates were used.  
 
For examining the effects the restrictive legislation has had on Muslim women this study will rely 
on secondary sources, and analyse the interview material provided in The Open Society Report 
“After the Ban: The Experiences of 35 Women of the Full-Face Veil in France” from September 
2013. The research is conducted by Naima Bouteldja who interviewed 35 women who were either 
still wearing it in 2013 or had been wearing when the national debate on the veil had been launched 
in 2009. Majority of the interviewees were from Paris. As the name of the report indicates, it 
examines the effects the ban has had on the lives of the 35 women interviewed. The report includes 
multiple parameters against which the effects have been measured, and this research will briefly 
take a look at the effects on the women’s personal life and their families, their health, and their 
socialising with the outside world. Secondary source is employed for two reasons: time constraints 
and the importance individual testimonies have when examining the implications of the ban.  
 
																																																						
1All	reports	from	2007	to	2017:	https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-
reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2.		
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Finally, this research will examine how the restrictive legislation has been presented in the 
extremist propaganda. For the purposes of trying to analyse the implications of the French burqa 
ban on radicalisation and terrorist activity, I have gone through the English versions of Islamic 
State’s Dabiq and Rumiyah magazines from 2014 to 2016 and 2016 to 2017 respectively, and al-
Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) Inspire magazines from 2010 to 2017. In addition, as 
the focus of this research is France, I went through all ten issues of Islamic State’s French language 
magazine of Dar al-Islam. For the analysis, I searched for mentions of France and either the full-
face veil ban or hijab ban. All materials are obtained from a “clearinghouse” project website called 
jihadology.net2 created and maintained by Aaron Y. Zelin, a research fellow of the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy. 
 
  
7.2. Methodology and Case Selection  
 
The research will be carried out as a single country case study. The advantage of a case study is 
that it allows for an intense examination of one case while making it still possible to draw 
generalisations that will also be applicable in other cases. This means that while being internally 
valid, case studies can also be externally valid (Halperin and Heath 2012: 205).  
 
The case examined in this study is France. Being the first country in Europe to implement a blanket 
ban on full-face veils and also having in place a ban on religious symbols in schools, France offers 
a good case for examining the effects and implications in a longer time period. As the goal of this 
research is to determine whether the burqa ban has had any implications on radicalisation or 
terrorist activity, it is of utmost importance, that the selected country has had the ban in place for 
long enough time to make any kind of measurement or analysis possible. In France’s case, the ban 
has been in effect since 2011 and there is also a comprehensive body of research conducted on it 
already, which helps in determining what has been already found and what requires more 
examination. The availability and quantity of data is then one the most important reasons for 
choosing France.  
 
This study and the methodology has limitations, especially when it comes to determining whether 
the burqa ban affects radicalisation and terrorism or not. For this purpose, the research design of 
																																																						
2	http://jihadology.net.	
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this study combined with the available data allows merely the examination of various parameters. 
Making definitive or robust conclusions is not possible in the framework set out by this research. 
However, the examination of the issue from different angles and the support provided by the 
theoretical framework allow bringing focus on the issue and making initial inferences as to 
whether the ban has been successful or not.  
 
The original aim of this research was to argue to that a burqa ban increases radicalisation and 
terrorist activity in a country. The goal was to examine whether countries with bans or restrictions 
on the use of the full-veil in place were more likely to experience terrorism and have foreign 
fighters leave for the conflict in Syria and Iraq. The region of interest was specifically Europe. 
However, testing this argument would have required a research design with a country-year unit of 
analysis, a comprehensive set of control variables and most importantly, sufficient amount of data 
to reach robust, generalizable and relevant results.  
 
However, most of the countries who have implemented restrictions on the use of the full-veil have 
done so only recently. As laid out in the beginning of this research, most bans have entered into 
force in 2015, 2016 or 2017, which makes running statistical models and attempts to draw 
conclusions not possible. There is very little quantified and comprehensive data available. In order 
to still be able to examine the implications of the burqa ban, the main argument was modified to 
one that has larger and less determinant scope. In a similar fashion, the research design was 
changed to a case study to allow for a broader range of parameters to be considered for analysing 
the implications of the burqa ban in France.  
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8. Analysis  
 
8.1. The Burqa Ban in France   
 
France was the first country in Europe to introduce the so called burqa ban, i.e. ban on full-face 
veils, into its legislation. Law No 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 Prohibiting the Wearing of 
Clothing Concealing One’s Face in Public Spaces, passed the legislative process and was 
approved by the French Constitutional Council on October 7, 2010. The law entered into force on 
11 April, 2011. According to Article 1 of the law, no one is allowed to wear a face-concealing 
outfit in public space. Article 2 states that the public space consists of “roads as well as places 
open to the public or assigned to a public service” and that the prohibition does not apply “if the 
dress is prescribed or authorized by legislative or regulatory provisions, if it is justified by health 
reasons or professional reasons or it falls within the setting of sports practices or artistic or 
traditional events.” Articles 3 and 4 detail the punishment for violating the law (LOI n° 2010-1192 
du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public, legifrance.gouv.fr).  
 
In its decision from 7 October 2010, the Constitutional Council held that: 
 
“Whereas article 1 and 2 of the referred law has the purpose of responding to the appearance of 
practices, extremely rare until now, consisting of concealing one’s face in public spaces; and given 
that the legislators have considered that such practices may constitute a danger to public security 
and disregard the minimal requirements of life in society; that the legislators also estimated that 
women hiding their faces, voluntarily or involuntarily, are placed in a situation of exclusion and 
inferiority that is manifestly incompatible with the constitutional principles of liberty and equality; 
that in adopting the referred provisions, the legislators have completed and generalized rules to 
protect public order that until now were only reserved to specific situations;” (Global Legal 
Monitor 18.10.2010) 
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The Council made one reservation in the law, concerning the places of worship open to public. In 
these places the prohibition is not applicable (Global Legal Monitor 18.10.2010).  
 
As Amnesty International report from 2012 points out, France has had a legislation prohibiting 
concealment of the face in public demonstrations in place since 2009 to ensure the identification 
and possible prosecution of rioters concealing their faces. In addition, domestic legislation 
existing prior to 2010 already gave law enforcement officers powers to demand individuals to 
uncover their faces for identification purposes (Amnesty International 2012: 95—96). This 
indicates that the new legislation prohibiting face concealment is unnecessary addition to the 
existing legislation for the purposes of public security. In addition, the fact that these existing 
pieces of legislation already cover the law enforcement’s need for identification also indicate that 
the main target of the prohibition were not rioters or people purposefully concealing their face to 
hide their identity.  
 
This point is also confirmed by the remarks made by then President Sarkozy to the French 
parliament in 2009 where he declared the burqa is a representation of oppression of women and 
that it is not welcome in France. Following these remarks, the French National Assembly ordered 
a formation of a parliamentary commission to study the practise of wearing the full-veil and 
explore the possibilities to restrict its use. The commission’s final report concluded that the full 
veil is “contrary to the values of the Republic” and that the parliament should adopt legislation 
that describe it as such and prohibit its use (Nanwani 2011: 6). 
 
In addition, in the Constitutional Council ruling before the legislation was approved, the Council 
concludes that the new legislation is a response to appearance of practices that have been 
“extremely rare” until now (Global Legal Monitor 18.10.2010). The notion is further strengthened 
by the exceptions laid out in Article 2 of the law, which states that the prohibition does not apply 
to garments justified by health or professional reasons, sports practices, parties, artistic or 
traditional events. This basically leaves the Islamic full-face veil as the sole target of the legislation. 
The argument is also supported by multiple researchers who have argued that the main target of 
this law is the full veil (Howard 2012: 148; Bleich 2009: 373; Davis 2011: 117-118; Nanwani 
2011: 2; Cesari 2012: 444; Idriss 2016: 126-127).  
 
Both the public and political debate surrounding the legislation has largely focused on the fact 
that it would prohibit Muslim women from wearing niqabs and burqas, and the initial controversy 
	 49	
sparked debates around the world on whether banning the burqa was discriminatory or limiting 
the freedom of religion (Nanwani 2011: 1). The fact that the legislation is widely known and 
referred to as burqa ban also indicates that that is how it is interpreted around the world. 
 
The political and public debate about the role of the burqa in French society did not start with 
Sarkozy in 2009. The debate first surfaced already in the 1980s and then gained real significance 
in early 2000s. Amiraux (2016: 45) traces the birth of the 2004 ban on religious symbols in schools 
and the 2011 ban on full-face veils back to two governmental reports from 2003, which argued 
that the mere presence of religious symbols in the society created division. Additionally, these 
reports designated communalism and political Islam as number one threats to the Republic and 
claimed that secularism was essential factor in creating social cohesion and facilitating political 
and social integration to the French society. The Muslim headscarf was seen to contradict the rules 
of secularism and gender equality, and the burqa, as a visible representation of Islam, was seen to 
be in direct violation of secularism and hence, a threat to the society (Parvez 2011: 288, 291; 
Wiles 2007: 703).  
 
Secularism (laïcité in French) has a very central role in the French constitution. The French 
constitution, in accordance with the principles of laïcité, guarantees the freedom to practice 
religion in private instead of freedom of religion as it is understood in many Western democracies. 
This interpretation of secularism dates back to the law establishing the separation of Church and 
State which guarantees to separate the religious space from the public space. Religion can be 
practiced freely in religious institutions and in private while the public space is where the citizens 
“come together to live together” (Honicker 2014: 274; Bigea 2016: 18). This interpretation has 
been employed quite extensively in defence of the bans from 2004 and 2011. By choosing to wear 
the headscarf or the full-face veil, the women are refusing to “come together to live together”, to 
be part of the French society (see e.g. Freedman 2007: 30). 
 
The European Court of Human Rights also found the “living together” argument based on laïcité 
principles to be a reasonable justification for banning the veil in its ruling in 2014 when the French 
ban was challenged for violating the European Convention of Human Rights (S.A.S. v. France 
[GC] (no. 43835/11, ECHR 2014); Amiraux 2016: 38).  The ban was deemed a proportionate and 
justifiable way to preserve the conditions of “living together” and the protection the rights and 
freedoms of others (Lægaard 2015: 203—204).  
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8.2. The Burqa Ban in the Context of French Immigration and Counterterrorism 
Policies 
 
As has been mentioned above, the burqa ban in France has been seen to form part of both, the 
French immigration policies (Maillard 2005) and set of reactionary legislation formulated as a 
response to violent Islamist activities (Bleich 2009) or perceived too strong presence of Islam in 
Europe (Edmunds 2012; Pratt 2015). According to Bleich (2009: 371) several European countries 
have supplemented their regular counterterrorism practices with policies aimed at better 
integrating their minorities. According to him, the French laws restricting the use of the Islamic 
veil are examples of policies that compel integration of religious minorities by enforcing a certain 
set of cultural and societal standards on them and declaring other practices unwelcome. Beydoun 
(2016: 1296—1298, 1300) argues that in France counterterrorism policy and cultural assimilation 
policy as part of wider immigration policy are inherently linked and sees this as a result of the 
French approach to radicalisation as a problem of social integration.   
 
In France, integration of immigrants is better understood as assimilation of immigrants into the 
French society. This assimilation approach, often referred to as the Republican Model of 
Integration aims at the “obliteration of any “minority” identity in favour of “Frenchness,” with the 
objective of achieving a sense of equality through cultural similarity” (Wiles 2007: 703). This 
preference of individual over community (Maillard 2005: 74) ideal is manifested in the state’s 
refusal to collect data on the ethnicity of its citizens. Wiles (2007: 703) cites French academic 
Olivier Roy in writing that Muslims who identify themselves as something else before French, are 
best described as “casualties of the integration process.” In general, all minority, community or 
localized identities are regarded as threatening the unitary idea of French citizenship (Wiles 2007: 
704). The Islamic veil, be it hijab, niqab or burqa, in addition to being interpreted as a symbol of 
Islam (Wiles 2001: 699), is seen to symbolise community and collective identity within the French 
society, which contradicts the ideal of single, unitary French nation (Maillard 2005: 77—78).   
 
According to the assimilation theory, the assimilationist process will consist of “gradual 
disappearance of original cultural and behavioural patterns in favour of new ones” and will 
inevitably lead to complete assimilation (Algan et al. 2012: 4). The cultural assimilation approach 
is strikingly different to that of integration and multiculturalism favoured in the United Kingdom 
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and the United States and the roots of the approach can be traced back to the colonial times. The 
French colonial administration in North Africa was built on the idea that the colonies needed to 
be civilized and then assimilated to make then colonies and their citizens “French” and an integral 
part of the “motherland”. Already then, one of the key initiatives in cultural assimilationist 
approach was to persuade the women to abandon their headscarves (Wiles 2007: 703—704).  
 
Beydoun (2016: 1278—79) has further argued, that in France the cultural assimilation and 
counterterrorism policies are practically synonymous to the Muslim population and that their 
counter-radicalisation programmes are almost entirely dedicated on containing the stereotypical 
“Muslims terrorist” who is visibly Muslim and fits the French interpretation of masculine “Arab”. 
Cultural assimilation campaigns have formed the foundation of France’s counterterror program 
since the beginning of Jacques Chirac administration in 1995 (Beydoun 2016: 1296). The hijab 
ban of 2004 and burqa ban of 2011 together represent culmination of this policy.  
 
The French counterterrorism model puts heavy emphasis on pre-emptive actions, including robust 
intelligence-gathering in collaboration with third countries, “aggressive prosecution to dismantle 
terrorist networks in formation; and removals of foreign terrorism suspects and those accused of 
fomenting radicalization and recruitment to terrorism” (Human Rights Watch 7/2008: 6). This 
model is based on a very broad definition of what constitutes a terrorist offense and flexible 
judicial system that allows the authorities broader powers to detain, hold and prosecute suspects 
than in normal criminal cases. According to Human Rights Watch this has led to a situation where 
the French counterterrorism laws and procedures undermine the rights the suspects (Human 
Rights Watch 7/2008: 1—2). 
 
According to Human Rights Watch interviews, the broad definition of terrorism offence coupled 
with the low threshold for arrests strengthen the perception among French Muslim communities 
that all Muslims are treated as terrorist suspects. Interrogations of terrorism suspects often include 
religion-centred questions, including women being questioned on their choice to wear a headscarf 
and men asked about their opinions on gender equality (Human Rights Watch 7/2008: 75). In the 
scope of this research, this indicates that the Islamic veil is interpreted by the law-enforcement 
officials, at least to some degree, as a sign of radical or extreme views, Islamic fundamentalism 
or support for radical ideologies  
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After the state of emergency was enacted in the wake of the November 2015 terrorist attacks in 
Paris, authorities were granted even broader powers to search, detain and investigate terrorism 
suspects. The authorities were allowed to “monitor phone and online communications, perform 
warrantless searches, exploit digital media found during searches, and detain suspects without 
charges for up to 96 hours, among other measures.” (Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, 7/2017). 
According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, these measures have targeted the 
French Muslim community in disproportionate and discriminatory manner, often merely based on 
their beliefs or religious practices, such as donning a beard or wearing a religious dress, and not 
on any kind of concrete evidence of illegal behaviour (Amnesty International 26.9.2017; Human 
Rights Watch 3.2.2016). The almost two-year state of emergency was replaced in late October by 
a new counterterrorism legislation that made many of the special powers and measures permanent, 
granting the police and investigators extensive powers to hunt terrorist suspects (Vinocur 
31.10.2017, Politico). 
 
A new action plan against radicalisation and terrorism from 2016 put heavy emphasis on 
preventing radicalisation in prisons, education institutions and sports clubs by reinforcing the state 
monitoring of these facilities (France in the US 13.5.2016). Under the jurisdiction of the 2014 
French “Patriot Act” the authorities are also allowed to suspend passports and ban terrorist 
suspects from leaving the country (Counter Extremism Project 2017).  
 
Even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the law text itself, terrorism is a very prominent 
factor in the burqa ban. As noted above by Beydoun (2016), cultural assimilationist policies such 
as the burqa ban form the core if French counter-radicalisation policies. When examined in larger 
world political spectrum, similarities can be detected in how each step toward the burqa ban of 
2011 was preceded by violent terrorist incidents that were then used as justifications for stricter 
immigration and integration policies.  
 
Terrorist incident in Madrid in 2004 preceded the adoption of the 2004 headscarf ban, and the 
train attack and the threat of terrorism emanating from that was used by President Chirac as a 
justification for the ban. In the aftermath of the bomb attacks in London a year later, the nationalist 
Front National party used the attacks as a prefix to push for more policies that would increasingly 
target France’s Muslim population. The niqab was among the issues that according to the 
hardliners were in the way of assimilation. The ban in full-face veils was accepted in 2010 on the 
premises described above (Beydoun 2016: 1293). More recently, after the Charlie Hebdo attack 
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in 2015 the public debate circled around the question whether the France’s Muslim population 
could be culturally assimilated into broader society. The Paris Attacks of November 2015 on the 
other hand were followed by an unprecedented degree of state scrutiny and backlash focusing on 
the Muslim population, as manifested by the raids and detentions carried out under the state of 
emergency.   
 
The most recent example of reactionary policies and what is essence can be interpreted as local 
French officials answering to provocation by getting provoked is from July 2016. In the aftermath 
of the Nice Attacks of July 2016 several French cities temporarily banned the use of the full-body 
swimsuit burkini on their beaches claiming that they are “not respectful of good morals and 
secularism” and a “symbol of Islamic extremism” (Huckerby 24.8.2016, Time). A Cannes city 
official also referred to burkini, which covers the head but leaves the face uncovered in a similar 
fashion to hijabs, as a dress that makes allegiance to terrorist movements that France is at war 
against. A further argument provided in the Nice Administrative Court ruling upholding the ban 
stated that in the light of the July 2016 terrorist attacks in Nice, the burkini could not be interpreted 
as just being a “mere sign of religiosity” (Le Monde 13.8.2016). The burkini ban, even though 
short lived, offers the most straightforward example of how terrorism and the way Muslim women 
dress themselves are linked in the French public and political life.  
 
The burkini ban, implemented clearly as a reaction to the vehicular attack in Nice as proven by 
the remarks presented above, is a perfect example of a governmental entity reacting to terrorist 
attack by indiscriminately targeting all things visibly representative of the attacker. In this case, 
by turning their restrictive measures on Muslim women donning the burkini on French beaches 
and claiming that by wearing the full-body swimsuit, the women were supporting Islamic State or 
other terrorist groups, the officials attacked Islam. Instead of focusing solely on the culprits 
themselves, the officials did exactly what, based on the provocation strategy, the terrorist 
organisations wanted them to do.  
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8.3. Effects of the Burqa Ban on Muslim Women 
 
An Open Society Report from 2013 interview 35 Muslim women in France and asked them how 
the restrictive legislation had affected their lives. Based on the interviews, only eight respondents 
had removed their veils since the ban took effect while 27 women said they had continued to use 
the full-veil despite the ban. Four women had started wearing the veil as a result of the law banning 
it.  
 
According to the women who had decided to continue wearing the full-face veil, removing it 
would undermine their religious commitment and mean undermining part of their identity. Most 
of the women who had abandoned the veil had done so to comply with the law and to avoid 
harassment, arrest or assault (Open Society Report 2013: 2). The women who refused to remove 
their veils said that the ban had considerably restricted their movements, they socialised less with 
other people and only very rarely left their homes in fear of being subjected to general abuse by 
the public or being stopped by the police for not complying with the ban. Also, the women who 
had removed their veils told the interviewers that the law had restricted their mobility since they 
now feel more uncomfortable going out with their faces uncovered.  
 
The interviewees also felt that the ban had encouraged the public to harass Muslim women 
donning the full-veil even more directly and openly than before. Twelve women had been 
physically assaulted for wearing niqab in public and some had even had their veils forcefully 
pulled off by members of the public (Open Society Report 2013: 3). Data provided by the French 
Council against Islamophobia also confirms that Muslim women are more often recipients of any 
kind of discrimination and that in 2016, 100 percent of all physical attacks against Muslims 
reported to the council were against women (CCIF Rapport 2017: 9).  
 
The reasons the Muslim women provided for continuing to wear the veil in the Open Society 
Report (2013: 6—7) indicate that the women felt strongly that the veil was part of their religious 
commitment and identity, and that they would rather confine themselves into the “prisons” of their 
homes if going out would require denouncing their religion and giving up part of their identity. 
These sentiments echo the findings provided above about the reasons for which Muslim women 
in general wore the burqa or niqab. Identity was one of the factors found to be significant in 
women’s decision to wear the full-veil. These also indicate that by banning the garment, the 
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French government did not simply set restrictions on a piece of clothing or a something that can 
be simply characterized as a religious symbol, but rather on some Muslim’s identity.  
 
Several women also reported that their health had suffered because of the ban since they felt that 
they were prisoners in their own homes and feared going outside. The ban has also had a negative 
effect on their families and immediate circle of friends and relatives since their fear of going out 
restrict the activities they can do with their children and adds burden on their spouses (Open 
Society Report 2013: 11—13). 31 out of 35 women said that their situation had deteriorated since 
the implementation of the ban (Open Society Report 2013: 14).  
 
These results indicate that ban indeed affects larger population, not merely the women that the 
ban directly affects. The larger societal effects, as described by the negative implications caused 
to the respondents’ families and the negative and boldened attitudes of the general public towards 
Muslim women, are what make the burqa ban a potential factor in inducing radicalisation.  
 
 
8.4. The French Bans in Terrorist Propaganda  
 
One part of the analysis on the implications of the burqa ban in France, this study examines 
terrorist propaganda and recruitment material produced by Islamic State and al-Qaida in the 
Arabian Peninsula (hereinafter AQAP). I have chosen four magazines, of which three is produced 
by Islamic State and one by AQAP. Dabiq was chosen due to its role as the forerunner of Islamic 
State propaganda magazines; the birth of the Caliphate was announced in its first issue in 2014 
and the name of the magazine refers to the Syrian city of Dabiq where the final battle between the 
Western and Muslim forces is assumed to take place (Clarion Project 10.9.2014; BBC Monitoring 
4.10.2016). Dabiq was later replaced by Rumiyah, as was the French-language magazine Dar al-
Islam. Dar al-Islam was included in the material due to it focusing on delivering the propaganda 
and recruitment message solely on French speaking audience. Dabiq and Rumiyah are both 
published in several other languages in addition English, including French and Arabic. APAC’s 
Inspire magazine was chosen to avoid limiting the analysis only on Islamic State and for its longer 
publishing history than the other three magazines that only date back to 2014 earliest. The first 
issue of Inspire was published in 2010.  
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Analysing the effects of the burqa ban on radicalisation and terrorist activity could also be done 
without analysing propaganda and recruitment materials produced by terrorist organisations. 
However, as part of the argument in this study states that the burqa ban provides terrorist 
organisations with tools for recruitment and propaganda, I deem analysing the propaganda 
material crucial in determining whether the burqa ban has featured at all in the material and 
whether it has been used to incite aggression against France and the West.  
 
In the French language issues of Dar al-Islam, references to either the Islamic veil’s importance 
in general or to the French legislation banning hijab’s in schools and full-face veils in public places 
are made in at least four issues. The last issue, which dates back to August 2016, argues that the 
French ban on Islamic veils is an attempt to challenge Islam (Dar al-Islam Issue 10, 20.8.2016: 
21). France’s war against Islam is also a major issue throughout the issue and the issue claims that 
the terrorist attacks carried out in France show that France’s assimilationist policies have failed 
and that France lost the war when Islamic State managed to sow fear into the French society and 
affect their everyday life (ibid 26—27). The ninth issue (Dar al-Islam Issue 9, 26.4.2016: 4) on 
the other hand points towards the controversy in banning religious symbols and states that the 
French politicians seem to tolerate Jewish symbols, but feel the need to ban symbols worn by 
Muslims. More general references to the Islamic veil is made in the issue from February 2016 
(Dar al-Islam Issue 8, 6.2.2016: 4, 14).  
 
The November 2015 issue (Dar al-Islam Issue 7, 30.11.2015: 16) discusses the French ban on 
religious symbols in schools and secularity argument, and states that it is clear that this ban is 
meant to hijabs wearing of which was regulated by Allah himself. The writing makes it clear that 
the French ban is contradicting and questioning Islamic principles. The second issue (Dar al-Islam 
Issue 2, 11.2.2015: 10) includes a long article laying out the history of France’s hostility towards 
Islam. The hijab ban together with the secularist attempts to assimilate Muslims into the general 
French society are included as part of this history of hostility, and these actions are said to provide 
proof for all the Muslims that a true believer cannot be both a Muslim and French. The article 
further claims that the history proves that France is full of hatred towards Muslims.  
 
Rumiyah and Dabiq issues on the other hand make only few references to headscarves or full-face 
veils. Rumiyah issue five (6.1.2017: 12) instructs men to make sure that their wives wear proper 
hijab at all times and Dabiq issue 15 (31.7.2016: 23—25) describes Western women as victims of 
immoral Western liberalism that encourages women to be the exact opposite of modest and 
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humble. The article then continues to offer Islam as the only salvation to the promiscuous women 
of the West as Islam teaches that women should not compete with men or try to behave like men 
and should cover their bodies with a veil instead of showing them off. Issue 15 also includes a 
story by a Finnish female convert who describes her journey to Islam and mentions the hijab as 
being an issue to her Christian parents (Dabiq Issue 15 31.7.2016: 37). Dabiq issue 13 (19.1.2016: 
11) comments on the women’s need to cover their heads, but makes no reference to France or 
Europe.  
 
The AQAP magazine Inspire mentions both France and the legislation banning full-face coverings 
and hijabs. The newest issue from August 2017 (Inspire Magazine Issue 17, 13.8.2017) mentions 
France 42 times. France is accused of attacking Islam faith and Muslims and it is noted that France 
has a long history of animosity against Islam dating back to its colonial history in North Africa. 
The piece mentions how the collective memory of Muslims is filled by tragedies Muslims have 
faced in the hands of the French and how France has attempted to wipe out their culture and 
identity, change their customs, the language they spoke and the way they were educated. In the 
end, the article asks what France thinks it would have lost if it had just left Muslims alone, to 
practice their religion and speak their language in peace (Inspire Magazine Issue 17 13.8.2017: 
32—55). The text in itself does not make direct reference to the French legislation concerning 
hijabs and full-face veils, however, the several pages long article takes a wider aim at France and 
its history with Muslims and paints a picture of a country at war with all Muslims.  
 
Inspire Magazine Issue 14 (9.9.2015) mentions France 14 times, and continues the extremist 
narrative of a nation at war against Muslims and the long history of French aggression against 
Islam. Inspire Magazine Issue 10 (1.3.2013: 5, 16—17) mentions France 18 and makes also a 
reference to the legislation banning full-face veils by asking whether that is an example of the 
freedom France wishes to project. The veil ban is then paralleled to a French military operation in 
Mali and to alleged war crimes in there. The Mali intervention is also argued to be part of France’s 
“crusade war on Muslim land and its people” (Inspire Magazine Issue 10 1.3.2013: 5) and 
subsequently linked to the French legislation, by stating that “not long ago you attacked the hijab 
of the Muslim women” (Inspire Magazine Issue 10 1.3.2013: 5).  
 
This highlights the wider societal and transnational effects the legislation concerning hijabs and 
full-face veils have. The bans do not affect only the very people wearing hijabs or niqabs. By 
politicising the Islamic veil, the French government has given the terrorist ammunition to target 
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them and to use in their propaganda to radicalise and recruit ever more followers. As mentioned 
in the above theory section, the extremist propaganda targets the grey area of moderate Islam and 
attempts to radicalise their thinking both about the governments of Muslim countries and the 
Western governments and societies to gain more followers.   
 
The debate concerning the bans in Europe were discussed in Inspire Magazine issue 6 (Summer 
2011: 12) and it was concluded that there should be no debate about the women’s need to cover 
themselves as much as possible, as the niqab according to the magazine is an Islamic practise that 
should be followed.  
 
Western war against Islam and all Muslims is also a leading theme in Inspire Magazine Issue 5 
(29.3.2011: 37), where it is explicitly laid out that the war against Muslim women’s veil is part of 
this anti-Islam campaign. France is again mentioned explicitly in relation to Tunisia and it is said 
that France has “hunted the veiled Muslim women and spread immorality and corruption.” In a 
similar fashion, also the Inspire issues four (Inspire Magazine Issue 4, 16.1.2011: 11, 17) and two 
(Inspire Magazine Issue 2, 11.10.2010: 35,) bear short mentions of the new French legislation that 
bans the full-face veils in public.  
 
France’s and Belgium’s move to ban the full-face veil is a major theme in the first issue of Inspire 
from 2010 (Inspire Magazine 30.6.2010: 4, 7, 19—20) and the editors ask whether these moves 
provide enough proof that the two countries harbour “tremendous revulsion for Islam itself.” The 
issue contains a long article on the “battle on niqab” and argues that the niqab is “today’s 
manifestation of a clash of civilizations and an additional proof to a mounting body of evidence 
that the West is anything but tolerant towards its Muslim population.” (ibid. 19) The article argues 
that the niqab is attacked in the West because it is a visible representation of Islam, and by 
attacking the garment the West is attacking Islam. The two-page article lays out a defence of Islam, 
Muslims and the niqab while arguing that by banning the garment the Western states are 
continuing their colonialist attack against Islam.  
 
In addition, a propaganda video by French recruits from November 2014 makes a direct reference 
to the French ban on niqabs and burqas, by calling on other Muslims to travel to Syria and Iraq 
(Malik 20.11.2014, The Guardian).  
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Analysis of the propaganda material produced by Islamic State and AQAP indicates that the burqa 
ban has been extensively employed in French language propaganda material and in al-Qaida 
outreach material to strengthen the narrative about Western war against Islam and clash of 
civilizations. As mentioned above, the arguments pointing towards the full-face veil not being 
necessity in Islam fail recognise the societal effect of the ban, and how it can be employed beyond 
its imminent target. Muslim women in France and their families are the one to bear the daily 
consequences casted upon them by the restrictive legislation, however, the affected women and 
their families are not necessarily, or even most likely the ones that might radicalise as a result of 
the ban. The radicalising effect spans further away as indicated in the propaganda texts. The 
radicalising effect is created by the political, religious and cultural symbolism represented by the 
burqa, which then gives the radical groups the tools to argue that the ban is yet another way for 
France and the West to wage war against Islam.  
 
The symbolic nature of the garment has been pointed out by the proponents of the ban as well, 
both in political and public discourse, when symbol is said to represent extremism and in the case 
of the burkini ban as being sympathetic to the extremist cause. This further strengthens the 
extremists’ message and risks driving more people to support their cause.  
 
 
8.5. Terrorist Activity in France Since 2006 
 
In France, restrictive legislation on the use of hijabs has been in place for 13 years and on burqas 
and niqabs for about seven years. Since 2011 the threat of jihadist or Islamist terrorism in France 
has increased significantly. Based on the data collected from the Europol Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Reports from 2007 to 2017 France counts for 47 percent of all Jihadist inspired terrorist 
attacks in Europe and for 53 percent of all terrorism related arrests. France is also the only country 
where the number of arrests continued to increase quite significantly. The significantly higher 
number for years 2015 and 2016 however, can partly be explained by the on-going state of 
emergency that has been in place since the November 2015 Paris Attacks.  
 
When compared the five years since the adoption of the burqa ban in 2011 to the five-year period 
before the implementation of the new legislation, the difference in numbers is quite clear. All the 
Islamist terrorist incidents recorded in France since the Europol data collection started in 2006, 
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have taken place after the year 2011. From 2006 to 2011 the Europol did not record any Islamist 
terrorist attacks in France. From 2012 to 2016, there were altogether 26 incidents, 15 of the them 
in 2015 alone. This is quite significant difference. Similar trend can be detected in terrorism 
related arrests, as demonstrated in Figure 2. From 2006 until 2011 number of arrests kept 
decreasing in general, apart from a sharp increase in 2010. After the dip in 2011 with only 46 
arrests, the number of arrests doubled in 2012 with 91 arrests and have been quite radically 
increasing since. The numbers can be seen in Table 2. Table 1 contains statistics for the whole 
EU.  
 
This doesn’t mean that the increase can be traced back to the implementation of the burqa ban in 
2011 or that the increase is solely caused by the ban. These kinds of inferences could be only 
drawn from a larger data set that would include multiple observations and a set of control variables. 
The aim here is to simply observe the difference in numbers between the two five-year periods 
before and after the implementation of the ban in 2011. The start of the Syrian conflict in 2011 
and the sharp increase in incoming immigrants and refugees from 2014 onwards and the rise of 
Islamic State to the banner man of global Jihad are other significant phenomena that can explain 
the increase in both arrests and attacks.  
 
However, the numbers do indicate that the burqa ban has not decreased terrorist activity in France. 
As was mentioned earlier, the burqa ban as a policy measure is aimed at attempting to better 
integrate and assimilate Muslims into the French society. Cultural assimilation on the other hand, 
is an essential part of France’s counterterrorism policies aiming at reducing radicalisation and 
curbing terrorism through assimilating Muslims into the mainstream society. When analysed 
against this framework, it could be assumed that the restrictive legislation was intended to play its 
part in curbing terrorist activity in France. Based on these premises, it can be argued that the burqa 
ban has indeed failed and the exact opposite has happened.  
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Table 1. Islamist terrorist attacks and arrests in EU countries 2006-2016 		
		 		 		 		 		
		 Attacks		 %	of	total		 Arrests	 %	of	total		
France	 26	 47%	 1713	 53%	
Netherlands	 9	 16%	 121	 4%	
Belgium		 7	 13%	 264	 8%	
Germany		 6	 11%	 127	 4%	
Denmark	 5	 9%	 38	 1%	
Italy		 1	 2%	 201	 6%	
Sweden	 1	 2%	 20	 1%	
Austria		 0	 0%	 120	 4%	
Bulgaria		 0	 0%	 67	 2%	
Cyprus	 0	 0%	 4	 0%	
Czech	Republic	 0	 0%	 12	 0%	
Estonia	 0	 0%	 2	 0%	
Finland	 0	 0%	 11	 0%	
Greece	 0	 0%	 15	 0%	
Ireland		 0	 0%	 10	 0%	
Lithuania	 0	 0%	 1	 0%	
Luxembourg	 0	 0%	 1	 0%	
Poland	 0	 0%	 10	 0%	
Portugal	 0	 0%	 1	 0%	
Romania	 0	 0%	 51	 2%	
Slovakia	 0	 0%	 5	 0%	
Slovenia		 0	 0%	 3	 0%	
Spain		 0	 0%	 434	 13%	
Total	 55	 100%	 3231	 100%	
 
 
Table 2. Islamist terrorist incidents and arrests in France 
		 		 		
Year		 	Attacks	 Arrests	
2006	 0	 139	
2007	 0	 91	
2008	 0	 78	
2009	 0	 37	
2010	 0	 94	
2011	 0	 46	
2012	 4	 91	
2013	 1	 143	
2014	 1	 188	
2015	 15	 377	
2016	 5	 429	
Total		 26	 1713	
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Figure 1. Islamist terrorist incidents in France since 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Islamist terrorist incidents and arrests in France since 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Islamist	terrorist	attacks	in	France	since	2006
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 15 5
139
91 78 37 94 46 91
143
188
377
429
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Islamist	terrorist	attacks	and	arrests	in	France	since	2006
Attacks Arrests
	 63	
 
8.6. French Foreign Fighters 
 
In addition to the raw number of terrorist attacks and arrests alike, this study will employ the 
number of foreign fighters who have left France to join the conflict in Syria and Iraq as another 
variable to measure the level of radicalisation in France. Since the start of the conflict in Syria and 
especially after Islamic State announced the creation of its caliphate in 2014, academics, 
politicians and political analysts have been trying to explain why so many people born and raised 
in the West have decided to join the fighting. Therefore, the foreign fighter phenomenon offers a 
convenient way to observe and analyse and draw some conclusions of the overall level of 
radicalisation in a country.  
 
As shown in Table 3, it is estimated that France has produced around 1 700 foreign fighters. That 
accounts for 30 percent of the total estimated number of European foreign fighters. The second 
biggest foreign fighter sending countries are Germany and the UK which both have seen around 
760 people to leave the country to join different organisations in the conflict zones of Syria and 
Iraq.  France is then overwhelmingly biggest “producer” of foreign fighters in Europe. On a global 
scale, only five countries – Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey and Jordan – are estimated to 
have produced more foreign fighters than France. This is a significant observation when taking 
into account, that apart from Russia these are all Muslim countries.  
 
When it comes to foreign fighters, France provides a unique case in the European context. Even 
though the extend of the radicalisation problem experienced by the country is partly manifested 
by the large foreign fighter contingent, the causes can’t be traced down to one or two attributes. 
Just like it can’t be done with terrorism. However, even though the real effects of the burqa ban 
on radicalisation cannot be determined by merely looking at the raw numbers of foreign fighters, 
the numbers, once again, serve to indicate that a country with a restrictive legislation in place 
experienced an unprecedented mobilisation for violence in support of radical elements in Iraq and 
Syria. The comparison to fellow big European countries without similar country-wide legislation 
in place also highlight the significant difference in the numbers. Germany and the UK especially. 
When compared to the UK, a country that shares similar background as an old colonial power but 
where a burqa ban has not materialised despite it being debated from time to time, the difference 
is quite clear with France having a contingent of 1700 foreign fighters and the UK one of 760 
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fighters. On the other hand, it should be noted, that countries like Sweden and Finland with no 
bans on full-face veils in place, still feature quite on the foreign fighter statistics when the total 
number of fighters is adjusted to the population and to the size of the Muslims population (Soufan 
Group 2015; Benmelech and Klor 2016). This goes against the hypothesis when it comes to only 
analysing radicalisation in the context foreign fighters. Once again, no definite conclusions can 
be drawn merely based on these numbers, but examination and initial comparison can be made. 
Producing definite and statistically significant results will be the quest for future research.   
 
Table 3. European Foreign Fighters  
		 Foreign	Fighters		 %	of	European	Total		
France		 1700	 30%	
Germany	 760	 13%	
United	Kingdom		 760	 13%	
Belgium		 470	 8%	
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	 330	 6%	
Austria	 300	 5%	
Sweden	 300	 5%	
Netherlands		 220	 4%	
Macedonia	 136	 2%	
Spain		 133	 2%	
Denmark	 125	 2%	
Albania	 90	 2%	
Italy	 87	 2%	
Norway	 81	 1%	
Finland	 70	 1%	
Switzerland	 57	 1%	
Serbia	 50	 1%	
Ireland	 30	 1%	
Montenegro	 30	 1%	
Portugal	 12	 0%	
Moldova	 1	 0%	
Romania	 1	 0%	
Total	 5743	 100%	
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9. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this study was to examine and analyse the effects of burqa bans on radicalisation and 
terrorist activity. This study argued that by implementing legislation restricting the use of full-
face veil the governments risk exacerbating existing grievances and providing terrorist 
organisations with tools for recruitment, which increases radicalisation and terrorism. The 
theoretical framework used in this study assumes that terrorist organisations use terrorism as a 
tool to overcome the collective action problem and to e people for violence. This is achieved by 
launching terrorist attacks against, in this case, European publics to provoke the Western 
governments into an indiscriminate response, which in turn would increase the grievances, alter 
people’s beliefs and allegiances and in the end increase radicalisation.  
 
Analysis of the data collected from four different sources provides initial, albeit not definitive or 
robust, support for the argument. Examination and analysis of the testimonials of French Muslim 
women, the propaganda material, number of Islamist terrorist incidents and arrests, and foreign 
fighters originating from France indicate, that the burqa ban has had a negative effect on clear 
majority of the 35 women interviewed by the Open Society Report and their families. This 
provides support for the argument about the ban increasing grievances felt by the Muslim 
community. In addition, the French burqa or hijab ban was frequently mentioned in the extremist 
propaganda, reiterating their message about Western hostility and aggression against Islam. The 
increase in terrorist incidents and arrests in France together with the high number of foreign 
fighters who departed France to join the conflict in Syria and Iraq provide further support for the 
argument, even though their contribution needs to be approached cautiously.  
 
This thesis does, however, provide justification for arguing that a burqa ban can be interpreted to 
constitute an indiscriminate response on terrorism and radicalisation. Based on the analysis of 
existing literature, the empirical examples of existing or debated bans on the full-face veils and 
the case study of France, it can be concluded that the logic of provocation does materialise in the 
case study. This is especially clear when examining the burkini ban case from 2016 where it is 
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clear that the ban was instituted as a reaction to the July 2016 terrorist attacks in Nice. Another 
case in point comes from analysing the terrorist propaganda material, where it is clearly stated 
that the aim of the terrorist organisations in question is to goad the Western governments into a 
counterterrorism retaliation that would eliminate the grey zone of moderate Islam and mobilise 
Muslims to violence.  
 
The analysis of the propaganda material also provide support for the argument that by 
implementing bans on full-face veils European governments provide terrorist organisations with 
propaganda and recruitment tools. This is clear from the way the French bans are featured in the 
material and how they are used to underline the hypocrisy and anti-Islam nature of France and its 
policies. However, whether these tools have led to actual radicalisation cannot be determined 
based on this analysis. While the analysis of the terrorism and foreign fighter statistics, the Change 
Institute interview material and the propaganda material provided some support for the overall 
argument, it cannot be reliably said that the results of the analysis supported the hypothesis, which 
assumed that implementation of a burqa ban increases radicalisation and terrorism. The collected 
data and the results of the analysis are simply not robust enough to draw this conclusion.  
 
Even though the number of attacks and arrests after the ban was adopted in 2011 is higher with 
26 failed, foiled and successful attacks in the period of 2011-2016 compared to zero attacks in the 
five-year-period preceding the ban, the data is still very limited for drawing definite conclusions. 
Also, this research was based simply on observation of the figures and no control variables were 
used to create statistically significant results. Despite not being definite and robust, the data still 
offers an opportunity to observe patterns and changes. These indicate, that if understood as an 
attempt to curb terrorism through more efficiently integrating the minorities, the burqa ban has 
failed in its purpose. The testimonials of the Muslim women describing how they barely leave 
their houses anymore now that they cannot wear the full-veil and out of fear for being confronted 
or attacked by fellow citizens provide further support for this observation. 
 
Even though no concrete conclusions about the radicalising effects of the burqa ban could be 
reached in this research, the analysis of the literature and the case study materials in the context 
of the theoretical framework provide valuable insight on what kind of negative implications a ban 
on full-face veils might have and how both the legislation itself and the negative societal effects 
caused by it can be exploited by terrorist organisations in their quest to mobilise more people to 
violence. This study also managed to highlight the possible counterproductive nature of hard-line 
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counterterrorism policies. These are all observations that policy-makers should consider when 
formulating both, immigration and counterterrorism policies.  
 
As concluding remarks and suggestion for future research, I would return to the beginning of this 
thesis and repeat how relevant and timely this topic is in today’s Europe. Increasing number of 
countries is in the process of implementing a ban on the burqa or are considering it. This means 
that the effects of such legislation and whether it has indeed had any of the desired effects on the 
society need to be properly examined. For this reason, comprehensive data that allows thorough 
analysis of the issue is needed. This study, albeit very narrow and limited in its ability to provide 
results and draw conclusions, indicates that the burqa ban has had a negative effect on some 
Muslim women and that it has provided terrorist organisations a powerful propaganda message 
for dissemination. These findings should be further examined and additional analysis and methods 
should be applied in future research to answer the original research question of this study: are 
countries with existing legislation restricting the use of the full-face veil more likely to experience 
terrorism and increased radicalisation that countries with no such legislation? This thesis work 
provided valuable insight and initial analysis on this question, but the answer, if there is one, is 
left for the future research to provide.  
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